10.0 FEDERAL CONVENTIONS FOR USING ASC X12 TRANSACTION SETS

This part of the Federal Implementation Guidelines defines the Federal transaction set conventions. It includes the instructions for implementing the control and security structures and definitions of the usage indicators and applicable codes.

This version of Part 10 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines, incorporates the requirements and features of ANSI ASC X12 Version 004 Release 010 standards. It supersedes and cancels the 28 August 1997 version of Part 10.

Except where specifically otherwise indicated, this document directs how the agencies, components and activities of the United States Federal government will exchange Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) data formatted in accordance with the provisions of the ANSI ASC X12 standards.

10.1 INTRODUCTION

The power of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X12 standard is in its building block concept, which standardizes the essential elements of business transactions. The concept is analogous to a "standard bill of materiel and the construction specifications," which gives the architect flexibility in what can be designed with standardized materiel and procedures. The Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system designer, like the architect, uses the ASC X12 standards to build business transactions that are often different because of their function and yet utilize the ASC X12 standards. The "bill of materiel and the construction specification" of ASC X12 are the standards found in the published technical documentation.

ASC X12.3, *December 1997*—The *Data Element Dictionary* specifies the data elements used in the construction of the segments that comprise the transaction sets developed by ASC X12.

ASC X12.5, *December 1997*—The *Interchange Control Structure* provides the interchange control segment (also called an envelope), consisting of a header and trailer, for the EDI transmission; it also provides a structure to acknowledge the receipt and processing of the envelope.

ASC X12.6, *December 1997*—The *Application Control Structure* defines the basic control structures, syntax rules, and semantics of EDI.

ASC X12.22, *December 1997*—The *Data Segment Directory* provides the definitions and specifications of the segments used in the construction of transaction sets developed by ASC X12.

ASC X12.58, *December 1997*—The *Security Structures* define the data formats for authentication, encryption, and assurances in order to provide integrity, confidentiality, verification and non-repudiation of origin for two levels of exchange of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) formatted data: functional group and transaction set level.

X12.59, *December 1997*—The *Implementation of EDI*Structure/Semantic *Impact* provides a clear distinction between the syntax of X12 structures and the semantics of transaction set usage.

X12C/TG1/95-65—Technical Report Reference Model for the Acknowledgment and Tracking of EDI Interchanges summarizes the use of the ANSI ASC X12 control elements and standards for the acknowledgment and tracking of EDI interchanges.

International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Recommendation X.509 (1993)/ ISO/IEC 9594-8 (1995), Information Technology-Open Systems Interconnection-The Directory: Authentication Framework. The Directory, defines a framework for the provision of authentication services by the Directory to its users. It specifies the form of authentication information held by the Directory, describes how authentication information may be obtained from the Directory, states the assumptions made about how authentication information is formed and placed in the Directory, defines three ways in which applications may use authentication information to perform authentication, and describes how other security services may be supported by authentication.

In addition to using existing standards to build specific transactions, the standards may be used to provide control and tracking of interchanges if accomplished in a specific standardized approach. ANSI ASC X12 has defined and approved several control structures and Transaction Sets intended to augment EDI auditing and control systems. It is the intent of these standards to provide a tracking mechanism for EDI data as it moves through the transmission cycle. Through the implementation of these tracking tools and analysis of the resulting information, delay or failures in delivery can be identified and corrected.

The work accomplished by ANSI ASC X12C in this area produced a generic acknowledgment model that has been adapted to support Federal Government EDI processes. Implementation of the acknowledgment mechanisms identified by this model will provide a basic capability to track interchanges as they flow from senders through Service Request Handlers (SRH) to receivers across the Electronic Commerce (EC)/EDI Infrastructure. (An SRH is a service provider whose primary function is to provide communications services between other components in the model.) This basic capability will provide functionality for each component to determine translation and transmission status, including current location and disposition of an interchange. Use of the implemented acknowledgment mechanisms to determine singular event status can

provide components with the information necessary to obtain some level of confidence that interchanges are flowing through the infrastructure properly. Taken as a sequence of acknowledgment events, the model provides senders with a means to track interchanges from generation to delivery to a Service Request Handler at the boundary of the infrastructure, without imposing the processing and communications overhead that would be required for true application to application acknowledgments.

In addition, the implemented acknowledgment mechanisms of this model will allow individual components to build upon or enhance their internal audit trail processes.

This part of the Federal Implementation Guidelines is meant to be an overarching architecture of the control and security structure which the government is implementing in the Electronic Commerce Infrastructure (ECI) and other government EC activities. However, not all the parts of the architecture will be implemented immediately. The specifics of which parts are actually implemented will be defined in agreements between actual components in the trading network and architecture, such as Value Added Networks (VANs) and government users of the ECI.

It is not the intent of this guideline to specify how the implemented acknowledgment mechanisms are to be used. While support of these mechanisms is required, their usage between infrastructure components will be as agreed between those components. The use of certain acknowledgement mechanisms between the government and VANs and gateways is specified in an Agreement between the parties. When there is a conflict between the implementation guidance provided in the Part 10 and the Agreement, the Agreement shall take precedence. Also, the use of acknowledgments between Government Points of Translation (GPoT) and other infrastructure components can be as mutually agreed upon.

The Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the ECI and the respective government Automated Information Systems (AIS) acts in a similar manner as the Agreement between the government and VANs and gateways. Where there is a conflict between the implementation guidance provided in Part 10 and the SLA, the SLA shall take precedence.

By focusing on basic acknowledgment functionality that is independent of communications protocols, enhanced tracking of interchanges is accomplished without requiring individual components to adhere to or support a full accountability system.

For further clarification of acronyms, abbreviations, and codes, refer to ASC X12 published technical documentation. For copies, contact either the EDI focal point within your service or agency, or, alternatively, contact the administering body (see Section 1.3 of these guidelines).

10.1.1 Year 2000 Compliant Date Formatting

Data elements reflecting dates in ANSI ASC X12 version/release 004010 and beyond are capable of carrying Year 2000 (Y2K) compliant dates in the standard date format (CCYYMMDD). While the use of 004010 and higher versions are the preferred alternatives for becoming Year 2000 compliant, a methodology for distinguishing between the 20th and 21st centuries is necessary. For the purpose of Y2K compliance, the following are work-around and permanent solutions for meeting Y2K compliance.

10.1.1.1 Bridging (49/50 rule) is applicable for versions 2003-3070.

Bridging is a technique in which a year of 00-49 is considered to reference the year 2000, and a year of 50-99 is considered to reference the 1900 year. This solution requires that the AIS make modifications to decipher the bridging schemes. If necessary, those systems that employ a "bridging" scheme will need to identify ICs that are impacted and provide additional implementation notes on the usage of the bridging scheme.

Note: The bridging solution is the only option available for systems based on versions 002003–003010; these versions of the ANSI X12 Standard do not support the century date format.

Examples of bridging using the 6-digit date format to depict the century. [YYMMDD]

- 1. 19[**501206**] = 1950 December 06 YYMMDD
- 2. 19[**591206**] = 1959 December 06 YYMMDD
- 3. 20[00**1206**] = 2000 December 06 YYMMDD
- 4. 20[**491206**] = 2049 December 06 YYMMDD

10.1.1.2 Date & Century Data Elements is applicable for versions 003020-003070.

Use data element 373 [Date YYMMDD] in conjunction with data element 624 [Century CC].

Use data element 1250 [Date Qualifier CC] in conjunction with data element 1251 [Date Time Period].

Note: Systems based on versions 003020–003070 can either use the bridging solution or composite date solutions (DATA ELEMENT 373 and DATA ELEMENT 624) or (DATA ELEMENT 1250 and 1251) for Y2K compliance. If the ICs impacted do not support the composite date solutions (i.e. DATA

ELEMENT 373 or 1250 marked "Not Used"), then the bridging

solution is appropriate.

10.2 CONTROL SEGMENTS

In addition to communications control, the EDI interchange structure provides the standards user with multiple levels of control to ensure data integrity. It does so by using header and trailer control segments designed to identify uniquely the start and end of the interchange functional groups and transaction sets. The relationship of these control segments is shown in Figure 10.2-1. Control Segment specifications are defined in Section 10.6.

10.2.1 Description of Use

The interchange header and trailer segments (ISA/IEA) along with the optional interchange acknowledgment segments (TA1 and TA3) constitute the interchange control structure (i.e., an interchange envelope). Interchange control segments perform the following functions:

- Define data element separators, subelement separators and data segment terminators
- Provide control information
- Identify interchange sender and receiver
- Allow for authorization and security information.

The actual interchange control structure includes neither the group control structures nor the transaction control structures; these are defined by ASC X12 as application control structures, and their version and release may differ from those for the interchange envelope. An interchange envelope encompasses one or more functional groups (GS/GE), which, in turn, enclose one or more related transaction sets (ST/SE). The relationship for these structures is illustrated in Figure 10.2-1.

The purpose for GS/GE functional grouping is to provide an additional control envelope surrounding like transaction sets conforming with a unique Implementation Convention (IC). Their usage is prescribed as interchange control segments in order to present a consistent methodology for EDI within the government community and for commercial entities that conduct EDI business with the government.

Implementation Note: The Federal Government Electronic Commerce Infrastructure (ECI) shall send and receive textual data ASCII encoded. If unencrypted binary segments are filtered, Base 64 filtering shall be used.




Figure 10.2-1. Hierarchical Structure

Note: When an Interchange contains TA3s, it shall contain only TA3s. The TA3s replace all Functional Groups, Security Envelopes, Transaction Headers and Trailers, as well as Detail Segments in the above diagram.

10.2.1.1 Data Element, Data Segment, and Component Data Element Separation

In ASC X12 documentation, the data element separator is graphically displayed as an asterisk (*). The actual data element separator employed within the interchange envelope dictates the value for the entire interchange. The first occurrence of the data element separator is at the fourth byte of the interchange control header. The value appearing there dictates the data element separator used through the next interchange trailer.

In a similar manner, the interchange control header establishes the value to be used for segment termination within an interchange. ASC X12 documentation represents this graphically by a new line (N/L). The first instance of segment termination occurs immediately following the ISA16 data element, and the data value occurring there sets the value for the interchange.

Designation of a component data element separator differs from the other separators in that the ISA segment provides a discrete element (ISA16) for defining the component data element separator data value.

Implementation Note:

- 1. ASCII hexadecimal character 1C shall be used as the segment terminator in Federal Government interchanges.
- 2. ASCII hexadecimal character 1D shall be used as the data element separator in Federal Government interchanges.
- 3. ASCII hexadecimal character 1F shall be used as the component element separator in Federal Government interchanges.
- 4. These characters are reserved for these purposes and shall not be used in data elements, except that they may be used in data element 785, Binary Data.
- 5. Failure to comply with the 1C, 1D, and 1F terminator/separator guidance will result in transaction errors.
- 6. All senders of transactions across the Government's EC infrastructure are required to follow this guidance.
- 7. Due to reliability, throughput, and speed-of-service concerns, government and commercial trading partners are encouraged to use File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) instead of dial-up protocols to access the electronic commerce infrastructure. These delimiters may not work with bisync communications.

10.2.1.2 Identification of Implementation Convention

The Federal Government develops ICs based on ASC X12 standards. All entities conducting EDI business within the Government or externally with the Government shall comply with all applicable ICs. Implementation Conventions are available from National Institute of Standards and Technology acting as the secretariat for the Federal EDI Standards Management Coordinating Committee (FESMCC). Conventions on the use of interchange control structures are provided herein to document a consistent approach to control structure content. The functional group control structures include the ability to identify specific ICs to which the Transaction Sets contained within that group conform.

Interchange senders will provide the ASC X12 Version/ Release/Subrelease and IC identifier in GS08. This identifier uniquely identifies the convention to which the transaction set conforms.

Implementation Note: Envelope control segments have few options and, except for minor tailoring, are identical for every EDI interchange. The tailoring involves the code values selected for the GS01 and GS08 elements. GS01 classifies the particular transaction set(s) within a functional group and GS08 identifies the specific IC with which the transactions contained within the group comply. (Note: The version and release identified in ISA12 pertains to the interchange control envelope, not to the contained transaction sets.)

The Version/Release/Industry Identifier Code (GS08) is structured as follows:

Positions 1 through 6: ANSI ASC X12 Version and Release

number (e.g. 004010) upon which the

IC is based.

Position 7 Organizational Scope

A = APADE

F = Federal

D = DOD

G = Government (Internal)

R = Rework

1 = MADES I

2 = MADES II

5 = SACONS 2.5

6 = SACONS 2.6

Positions 8 through 10 Transaction Set Identifier Code (e.g.

Position 11: Derivative: A character used to

> define the functionality of a specific implementation of a transaction set.

> If the convention is not a derivative, an underscore (_) will appear in this

position.

The specific value is assigned by the functional working group responsible

for the development of the IC.

Position 12: A sequential number starting with 0

and incremented by 1 each time the

convention is reissued.

An example of the Version/Release/ Industry Identifier Code for X12 Version 004010, Federal Specific IC, revision 1, Commercial Invoice (810C) is 004010F810C1.

10.2.1.3 **Control Numbers**

ASC X12 standards provide for syntax control on three levels: interchange, group, and transaction. Within each level, control numbers exhibit a positive match between the header segment and its corresponding trailer (i.e., ISA/IEA, GS/GE, and ST/SE). Assignment of these control numbers, at each level, is as follows:

Implementation Note: ISA/IEA Interchange Control Numbers (ISA13/IEA02).


- 1. The nine-digit interchange control number is usually assigned by the originator's translation software. Originating organizations may use any numbering scheme consistent with their business practices.
- 2. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each interchange. Unique identification is defined as the triplet: Interchange Sender ID, (ISA05, ISA06), the Interchange Receiver ID, (ISA07, ISA08) and the nine-digit Interchange Control Number (ISA13). This triplet shall be unique within a reasonably extended time frame.
- 3. If there is no TA3, Interchange Delivery Notice, after 2 hours, then retransmit with the same interchange control number (ISA13).
- 4. If an interchange is rejected, the corrected interchange shall have a new interchange control number (ISA13).

Implementation Note: GS/GE Data Interchange Control Numbers (GS06/GE02).

- 1. This is a one to nine-digit number usually assigned by the originator's translation software. This number uniquely identifies functional groups transmitted between sending and receiving application pairs. Originating organizations may use any numbering scheme consistent with their business practices.
- 2. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each functional group. The Group Control Number value (GS06), together with the Application Sender's Code (GS02), Application Receiver's Code (GS03), and Functional Identifier Code (GS01), shall be unique within an extended time frame—such as a year.

Implementation Note: ST/SE Transaction Set Control Numbers (ST02/SE02). The originator's translation software usually assigns the transaction set control number. Originating organizations may use any numbering scheme consistent with their business practices. The scheme must provide sufficient uniqueness to identify each transaction set, within the context of the functional group.

The control numbers within corresponding header and trailer segments must match. This provides a means to detect loss of data.



10.3 ADDRESSING

The purpose of addressing is to provide an unambiguous reference to a transmission's sender and intended receiver. The addressing model used by the Federal Government for ASC X12 EDI transmissions is graphically depicted in Figure 10.3-1. In this model, there is addressing for two types of transmissions. The first is an interchange. It consists of control segments and application data. The second type is application data. Application data flow from the sending to the receiving applications and is transported

within an interchange. Since interchanges are assembled by the sending translation point and disassembled by the receiving translation point, the flow of an interchange is defined to be from translation point to translation point. Application data must be provided to the sending translation point by the sending application and is depicted as a User Defined File (UDF). It must also be provided to the receiving application by the receiving translation point and is also depicted as a UDF.

While the model depicts data flow from the government to a vendor, it is equally applicable in the reverse flow.

10.3.1. Interchanges

Interchanges flow between translation locations. The GPoT can be implemented as part of the government AIS, as part of the Electronic Commerce Processing Node (ECPN), or as a stand-alone function. Likewise, the Industry Point of Translation (IPoT) on the vendor side can be in the Vendor Application, as part of the VAN's services, or as a stand-alone function.

The GPoT and IPoT are addressed by the Interchange Sender ID (ISA05 and ISA06) and Interchange Receiver ID (ISA07 and ISA08) data elements. These, combined with the Interchange Control Number (ISA13), create a triplet that defines a globally unique identifier for the interchange. The ASC X12 Interchange flows between these translation points.

Implementation Note:

- 1. When an interchange contains one-to-one transactions, the Interchange Sender ID (ISA06) and Interchange Receiver ID (ISA08) data elements shall be the addresses of the interchange translation points (both government and non-government).
- 2. Translation Points (ISA06 and ISA08) shall be identified via a unique identifier from one of the sources listed as allowable codes in the ISA05 definition in section 10.6. The Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number and DUNS+4 are the preferred identifiers.
- 3. All commercial and government entities conducting business electronically shall provide their translation point (ISA06/ISA08) codes during registration.
- 4. In the ECI, when an interchange contains public transactions the ISA08 will be addressed individually to all certified VANs, not necessarily each IPoT. The ISA06 will contain the ECPN's address.

10.3.2 Application Sender and Receiver Codes

Application data is transported within the interchange via groups. Group addressing (GS02/GS03) must define the user application end points shown in Figure 10.3-1 as the AIS and the Vendor

Application. These addresses are locally unique and are defined between the translation point and its customers. The data that flows between the translation points and the Application Senders and Receivers are not defined by ASC X12, but are in a format agreed between the applications and their translation points.

ASC X12 standards provide for the identification of senders and receivers on two levels, the interchange and the group. The group level identifies application senders and receivers. Depending on where translation is performed, the sender/receiver IDs may be the same at the interchange and group levels and may use any number of available naming schemes.

At the GS/GE level, DUNS and DUNS+4 are recommended, especially for identifying government organizations. Other identifiers may be used.

A DUNS number may be acquired from Dun and Bradstreet and the plus 4 portion of the number is assigned and maintained internally by each entity. Specific use of these numbers is provided for in the control structures section of this document.

Implementation Note:

- 1. The GS02/03 identifiers need be unique only within the context of the associated ISA address.
- 2. All commercial and government entities conducting business electronically shall provide their Application Sender and Receiver (GS02/GS03) codes during registration.

10.4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The successful conduct of business via EDI requires that trading partners be able to determine when transactions were received, not received, received in error, or otherwise did not complete the transmission or receiver application processing cycle. The generation or handling of these events may be communications based, EDI processing based, or both. In addition, senders may desire to know such information on an exception basis, such as reporting only for error conditions, or they may need regular indication of the status of delivery to allow them to maintain local, internal audit information. Also, providers of communications services may need to know when interchanges for which they have accepted responsibility were forwarded and accepted by the next service provider in the transmission path, or whether forwarding was not successful.

In either scenario, the transmission or processing of interchanges can be viewed as an acknowledgment event in a general sense, creating the need for some response. From a sender's perspective, the acceptance of their interchange by a translator or communications provider is an acknowledgment event that could either be indicated by a simple receipt, or a more thorough reporting of what actions were taken after receipt. For a service provider,

forwarding interchanges can also result in an acknowledgment event being created that calls for an acknowledgment action to take place.

Taken as a set of acknowledgment requirements, these and other events can be considered as a set of circumstances which results in or require some acknowledgment action to take place. Rather than consider every possible action and event, a basic subset of these events can be defined that describes the majority of cases that form a generalized picture of tracking interchanges. Together with acknowledgment mechanisms that relate to those events and specific components that create or respond to those events, an acknowledgment model can be described.

ANSI ASC X12C has worked in this area, having produced a generic Acknowledgments Model in X12C/TG1/95-65—Technical Report Reference Model for the Acknowledgment and Tracking of EDI Interchanges. This technical report identifies specific entities in the EDI communications and processing path that serve as the event generators or handlers, as well as identifying X12 standards based acknowledgment mechanisms. Also, the senders and receivers of the interchanges are recognized as being the terminating application systems for which the EDI transactions are sent from or sent to, regardless of where translation occurs. The government has taken the ANSI X12 approach to an acknowledgments model, refining it through identification of specific entities and acknowledgment events. Support for this model will provide users and service providers with the ability to track interchanges and respond to requests for status of such interchanges. In addition, the internal audit trail processes of each entity will be enhanced with the availability of specified event mapping.

10.4.1 Description of Acknowledgment Model

As adapted from the generic model developed within ASC X12C, the Government Acknowledgment Model identifies specific components, acknowledgment events, and X12 mechanisms that are related to those events. Based upon the Electronic Commerce Processing Node (ECPN) as a central component, the model establishes a view of the EC/EDI Infrastructure as encompassing commercial and government entities, as well as service providers and users.

In this model, service providers are those components that provide translation services, communications services, or some EDI processing services. Specifically, the model identifies the ECPNs, VANs and Translation Points as service providers. A Service Request Handler (SRH) is a service provider whose primary function is to provide communications services between other components in the model. Users include Trading Partners (TPs) and Automated Information Systems (AISs).

The acknowledgment mechanisms identified in the model include unspecified as well as X12 based mechanisms. Where the model has identified an acknowledgment event but does not specify a

mechanism for handling that event, it is implied that components involved in that event will agree on what mechanism will be used.


X12-based acknowledgment mechanisms include control segment structures in addition to transaction sets. The Interchange Delivery Notice (TA3) segment, Data Status Tracking (242) transaction set and the Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set all have distinct properties and functions. However, their use in a general sense as acknowledgment mechanisms allows a sequence of communications and processing events to be tied together in a logical stream. Each acknowledgment event is mapped to an X12 standards based mechanism according to where the event takes place, what type of event occurred, and what role the receiving or generating component plays in the data flow stream.

The TA3 can provide information on the status of delivery of an interchange, the time an interchange was received, or the disposition of an interchange, and is used to report such information between Service Request Handlers. The Data Status Tracking (242) transaction set, in addition to providing the ability to represent the information contained in the TA3, allows transmission status information to be conveyed from service request handlers to senders. The Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set indicates the status of translation of the interchange header and trailer information. These mechanisms are more fully described later in this section.

The model, as depicted in Figures 10.4-1, 10.4-2, 10.4-3, and 10.4-4, identifies the sets of events that, through implementation and use of the specified acknowledgment mechanisms, provides for the tracking of interchanges across the infrastructure.

Implementation Note:

- 1. While the requirement for acknowledgments from GPoT to supported AISs was identified, no single mechanism could be identified. It is therefore left to agreement between them as described in the Service Level Agreement.
- 2. TA1 is not supported in this acknowledgment model implementation.
- 3. The government translation function can be implemented as part of the government AIS, as part of ECPN, or as a stand-alone function. GPoT acknowledgment responsibilities reside at the location performing translation.
- 4. The vendor translation function can be implemented as part of the Vendor Application, VAN or as a stand-alone function. IPoT acknowledgment responsibilities reside at the location performing translation.



Notes:

- a. The GPoT translation function may be performed by the ECPN, AIS, or by a separate entity.
- b. For the purposes of the model, the govt-to-govt scenario is represented by replacing the VAN-Translation components with a GPoT component.
- c. The IPoT may be operated by the VAN, the Vendor, or a third party. In all cases, the IPoT is the ultimate recipient of the interchange for the purposes of acknowledgment in this model.
- d. 997s and 242s can be mapped at the GPoT to UDFs & forwarded to the AIS as agreed between the GPoT and their customer base. 242s will not be acknowledged by 997s.
- e. UDF is User Defined File (flat file, proprietary file).
- f. The use of 824s are not precluded by this model.
- g. Support for the model acknowledgment mechanisms is mandatory. The manner of their usage is as detailed further in the Federal EDI Implementation Guidelines Part 10, or other agreements.


Figure 10.4-1 Acknowledgment Model, Commercial to Government

Sequence / Event	Mechanism	From	<u>To</u>
1. Receipt of UDF by GpoT	TBD	GPoT	AIS
2. Translation Result	TBD	GPoT	AIS
3. Disposition (Acknowledge that interchange	TBD	GPoT	AIS
has left GPoT)			
4. Interchange receipt by ECPN	242	ECPN	GPoT
5. Interchange Disposition at SRH	TA3	VAN	ECPN
(Government to Government)	TA3	GPoT	ECPN
5a Report of Interchange Disposition at SRH	242	ECPN	GPoT
5b. Report of Interchange Disposition at SRH	UDF	GPoT	AIS
6. Translation Result	997	IPoT	GPoT
6a Translation Result	UDF	GPoT	AIS

Notes

- a. Not all events 1, 2 or 3 may occur or need to be acknowledged
- b. TBD indicates the acknowledgment mechanism is to be determined, or as agreed to between components
- c. UDF: User Defined File (flat file, proprietary file format)

Figure 10.4-2 Acknowledged Events, Commercial to Government



Notes:

- a. Acknowledgments among VANs, Translation Points and their customers are matters to be decided by them and are not defined in the government Acknowledgment Model.
- b. Some GPoTs may generate a second 242, with the ECPN acting as a pass-through.
- c. For government to government scenario, replace the VAN with a GPoT. The ECPN will generate 242s in lieu of TA3s in step 1.

Figure 10.4-3 Acknowledgment Model, Government to Commercial

Sequence / Event	<u>Mechanism</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
1. Interchange receipt by ECPN	TA3	ECPN	VAN
(Government to Government)	TA3	ECPN	GPoT
2. Interchange Disposition at GpoT	TA3	GPoT	ECPN
2a. Report of Interchange Disposition at GPoT	242	ECPN	VAN
(Government to Government)	242	ECPN	GPoT
3. Translation Result	997	GPoT	IPoT

Note:

In step 2a, the disposition report carried in a TA3 is mapped to a 242

Figure 10.4-4 Acknowledged Events, Government to Commercial

10.4.2 Interchange Acknowledgment

At the interchange level, acknowledgments can occur for a number of events. Successful translation, syntax error, or a more detailed acknowledgment of the disposition of an interchange can be reported. The available X12 mechanisms for such interchange acknowledgments includes the Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set, the Interchange Acknowledgment (TA1), and the Interchange Delivery Notice Segment (TA3). In general, the 997 is used exclusively for reporting the status of syntactical analysis of the interchange by the receiving translator, although it could be used as an indication that an interchange was received. The Interchange Acknowledgment (TA1) is not supported in this acknowledgment model. The Interchange Delivery Notice (TA3) provides the ability for reporting on the status of actions taken on a particular interchange. The manner in which these mechanisms are used, and the features within each that are utilized, provides a set of tools for building a sequence of acknowledgments for the life cycle of an interchange as it flows across an infrastructure.

Implementation Note: The need to implement the 242 and TA3 transaction sets is under review. Federal government support for these transaction sets will be dictated by business decisions as electronic commerce continues to emerge.

10.4.2.1 TA3

The purpose of the TA3 is to provide a notice from the receiving SRH to the sending SRH that an interchange was delivered, not delivered, refused, purged, or transferred to the next SRH. It provides a notification of action taken, notice of time/date action was taken, and the ability to report on more than one event.

As an acknowledgment mechanism in this model, the TA3 is used between the ECPN and VANs, as Service Request Handlers, to indicate the status of interchanges sent from the government to commercial components, as well as the reverse scenario. To indicate outbound delivery status, the information contained in this TA3 is further translated into a 242 transaction set and sent to GPoTs for their use, which may include supplying this information to the interchange sender. The government uses the TA3 to indicate interchange delivery status to the sending commercial infrastructure components.

Implementation Note:

- 1. An interchange that contains a TA3 shall contain only TA3s.
- 2. An interchange may contain multiple TA3s.
- 3. Upon delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox, a TA3 shall be generated.
- 4. If delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox is not made within 2 hours, a TA3 shall be generated indicating a non-delivery

status. The appropriate reason codes will be specified. A TA3 shall be generated every 2 hours indicating non-delivery status until the interchange is delivered to the receiver's mailbox. Upon delivery, Note 3 above applies.

- 5. If an interchange is accepted but subsequently determined to be non-deliverable, a TA3 shall be generated indicating code RJ in TA312 and the appropriate reason code in TA303.
- 6. No acknowledgment is made for the receipt of a TA3.

10.4.2.2 Data Status Tracking (242) Transaction Set

The Data Status Tracking (242) transaction set conveys status information from a service request handler to the interchange sender, interchange receiver, or both. It can be used to provide status information regarding an interchange as it flows from an interchange sender through one or more service request handlers to an interchange receiver during its transmission cycle.

In the acknowledgment model, the 242 transaction set is used for two events: (1) it conveys information from the TA3 that was generated by the VAN or GPoT that received the interchange, and (2) it is used to provide acknowledgment information between government components. Because it is a transaction set, translation sites can map that information into a User Defined File (UDF) for the sending applications use. How this information is used depends on the internal business processes at the application site, and is not covered by the model. In addition, this information may be used by the GPoT in its capacity as a Service Request Handler for internal audit trail purposes.

Implementation Note:

- 1. For interchanges between government components, a 242 shall be generated upon delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox. If delivery to the interchange receiver's mailbox is not made within 2 hours, a 242 shall be generated indicating a non-delivery status.
- 2. The 242 transaction set shall not be acknowledged (via a 997), nor shall it be used to report the final disposition of a 997 transaction set.
- 3. Additional 242 acknowledgments from interconnect service providers may be required by additional agreements among trading partners.

10.4.2.3 Interchange Acknowledgment Segment (TA1)

The Interchange Acknowledgment Segment (TA1) is used to acknowledge receipt of one interchange header and trailer envelope.

Implementation Note: The TA1 is not supported in this acknowledgment model.

10.4.3 Application Advice (824) Transaction Set

Although it can provide acknowledgment functionality, use of the Application Advice (824) transaction set is not specified by this model. Currently, it is primarily used on an exception basis for reporting between applications, and its full use as an acknowledgment mechanism within the model would create substantial impact on the communications and processing systems.

10.4.4 Functional Acknowledgments (997) Transaction Set

While the Functional Acknowledgment (997) transaction set is not part of the interchange control structure, it is integral to the overall process for interchange integrity, and for completeness of the acknowledgment model.

Support for the Functional Acknowledgment is required in all cases. The 997 verifies (or challenges) the syntactical correctness (e.g., ability to translate) of transaction-level data within a functional group with respect to both the implementation conventions and the ASC X12 standard.

Implementation Note:

- 1. Syntactic correctness shall be determined by comparison to the requirements of the applicable implementation convention, not simply the ASC X12 standard.
- 2. The 997 transaction set shall not be acknowledged.
- 3. When an X12 transaction containing "Not Used" segments and/or data elements and/or codes is received by the Government, the transaction will be rejected and a 997 will be generated indicating why the transaction was rejected.
- 4. The flow of X12 997s between sender and receiver will not be interrupted by the Government's EC infrastructure.

10.5 SECURITY

ASC X12.58, published in December, 1997, provides for the implementation of security services at the functional group and transaction set levels for X12 version 004010. The available security services include: data integrity, confidentiality, assurance, verification, and non-repudiation of origin. These services may be implemented individually or in any combination.

ASC X12.58 can meet several security objectives. Among these are:

• The recipient of an EDI transaction can verify the identity of the originator of the transaction.

- The recipient of an EDI transaction can verify the integrity of its contents.
- The originator of an EDI transaction can provide confidentiality for its contents.

ASC X12.58 provides a mechanism that can be applied to the X12 functional group or transaction set, in contrast to other alternatives which are usually applied to the entire interchange. ANSI X12.58 is transaction data independent. When X12.58 security mechanisms are applied inside the interchange, they can be handled and routed as standard X12 transactions without disrupting the end-to-end security. Since security services are applied within the interchange, they are independent of the mechanism used to transport them. Thus X12.58 can provide security even when the interchanges leave the boundaries of the ECI.

Implementation Note:

- 1. The federal government is committed to providing security services for ASC X12 compliant EDI via the constructs provided by ASC X12.58. However, very significant changes to those constructs have been made within various version/releases of the ASC X12 standards. Also, ASC X12.58 security constructs are not backward compatible. That is, 004010 constructs may not be applied to provide security services to the bulk of the current federal implementations, which are in version/release 003070, 003060, 003050, 003040 and earlier. Due to the evolutionary development of security structures to support ASC X12 interchanges, the Federal Government has determined that it will not support security structures prior to version/release 003070.
- 2. The federal government does not currently support the X12.58 security mechanism.

10.5.1 Authentication

Message authentication is a procedure to verify that received messages have not been altered. A hash function, a public function that maps a message of any length into a fixed hash value, can be used as an authenticator when used in conjunction with some form of data encryption, such as digital signature.

Implementation Note: Assurance via the S4A/SVA segments shall be used in lieu of authentication. For 003070 implementations, assurance via the S2A/SVA shall be used.

10.5.2 Confidentiality (Encryption)

The X12.58 standards allows for the implementation of various algorithms to encrypt X12 transactions. Cryptographic algorithms fall into two categories: secret key and public-key. Secret key algorithms are based on both the sender and receiver sharing the same secret key (i.e., key unknown to other parties). This key is used to encrypt the transaction prior to transmission and decrypt it

upon receipt. Public-key algorithms are based on both sender and receiver having a pair of keys, one public and one private. All exchanges of keys between sender and receiver are limited to the public portion only, so the private key portion is protected. Encryption algorithms will be engineered to meet the requirement of compatibility with PKI. Initially, the Government will "consider" the following algorithms:

- Data Encryption Standard (DES)
- Triple DES (DE3)
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
- SKIPJACK

Implementation Note:

- 1. Confidentiality services may be applied at either the functional group (GS/GE) level, the transaction set (ST/SE) level or both.
- 2. When applied, the S3S shall be inserted immediately after the GS segment and the S3E shall be inserted immediately prior to the GE segment. For 003070 implementations, the S1S shall be inserted immediately after the GS segment and the S2E shall be inserted immediately prior to the GE segment.
- 3. When applied, the S4S shall be inserted immediately after the ST segment and the S4E shall be inserted immediately prior to the SE segment. For 003070 implementations, the S2S shall be inserted immediately after the ST segment and the S2E shall be inserted immediately prior to the SE segment.

10.5.3 Assurance (Digital Signatures)

A digital signature is an authentication technique that also includes measures to counter repudiation by the source. Assurances as defined in X12.58, allow the originator of the transaction to express "business intent" via a digital signature. The Government will support implementation of the Digital Signature Standard. When used, assurances are applied before any other security processes. In version 004010, the location of the group level assurance header segment (S3A) was changed. The S3A immediately follows the GS segment. The Security Value (SVA) segment follows any existing SVA segments and precedes the GE segment. This allows for efficient processing of the assurance segments. At the transaction level, the S4A segment replaces the S2A segment. The sequence of segments is detailed in Section 10.5.6

For 003070 implementations, one S2A and one SVA are inserted immediately before the SE segment of the transaction set being assured. If subsequent assurances are applied, additional S2A/SVA pairs are inserted between the previous assurance, and the SE

segment of the transaction set being assured. Detailed instructions for the use of the *assurance* segments are contained in section 10.6

Implementation Note:

- 1. Assurance (digital signature) may be applied at either the functional group (GS/GE) level, the transaction set (ST/SE) level or both.
- 2. When both assurance and confidentiality are applied, assurance (S3A or S4A and SVA) shall be applied first and then confidentiality (S3S and S3E or S4S and S4E).

10.5.4 X12.58 Capabilities by Release

Note: The following table and notes reflect capabilities provided by the X12.58 standard. For implementation of these capabilities reference the security structures in section 10.6.

ANSI X12 Release	Authentication	Encryption	Assurance
003040	(Note 1)	(Note 3)	
003050	(Note 1)	(Note 3)	
003060	(Note 2)	X	X
003070	(Note 2)	X	X
004010	(Note 2)	X	(Note 4)

NOTES:

- 1. Authentication accomplished using a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is a hash of the data.
- 2. Authentication accomplished as a by-product of the digital signature or by using the MAC defined in earlier releases of the ANSI X12 standard.
- 3. Private (symmetric) keys supported by this release. Asymmetric keying is possible but not without some "non-standard" use of data elements.
- 4. The assurance capability is applied via the (S3A or S4A and SVA segments.

10.5.5 Sequencing of Cryptographic Techniques

In practical situations, the users of the X12.58 standards will choose combinations of features rather than just a single feature. This is possible since all features are designed to be used in isolation or in any combination.

Authentication does not protect the confidentiality of the message because the information is interchanged in its plain text form. Message encryption can be used to provide confidentiality while using authentication to provide integrity protection of the same data. When both authentication and encryption are used, the authentication is performed before encryption of the original plain text data.

Where more than one service is selected at a specific level, the order of processing is:

- a) Before applying any security services, the data must first be translated into an EDI format.
- b) Addition of one or more assurances,
- c) Authentication.
- d) Compression,
- e) Encryption, and
- f) Filtering for data communications.

When assurance segments are used, they must be added to unsecured (not authenticated or encrypted) transactions. If a transaction set is received (with or without assurances) with encryption and/or authentication applied by the originator, the transaction set must be either decrypted or authenticated prior to the addition of any further assurances. Once any assurances have been added, the transaction set can be encrypted or authenticated prior to being forwarded to additional parties.

When applying security services at the functional group level, all security services at the transaction set level must be completed before applying security services at the functional group level.

The receiving organization processes the received message in the reverse order, starting with inverse filtering, followed by decryption, and then by decompression, validation of authentication and validation of the assurances. When processing inbound security services at the transaction set level, all security services at the functional group level must be removed before processing inbound security services at the transaction set level. In this manner the receiving organization unwraps the EDI message by processing the security services and removing the security segment pairs from the message before processing the next security service.

10.5.6 Transmission of Security Segments

Security services (authentication, encryption and assurances) are provided at two levels within ASC X12 in conjunction with the following envelopes:

- Functional Group (GS/GE envelope)
- Transaction Set (ST/SE envelope)

At each of these levels, authentication, encryption and assurances are each optional. Assurances are independent of authentication or encryption. In addition, any service used at one level is independent of a service used at the other level.

If encryption and/or authentication is provided, the security header segment (S3S or S4S) immediately follows the segment initiating the beginning of this level (GS or ST); the security trailer segment (S3E or S4E) precedes the segment terminating the level (GE or SE). If encryption and/or

authentication at both levels is provided and if assurances are used at both levels, the sequence of segments, illustrating these levels, is:

ISA – Interchange Header

GS – Functional Group Header

S3S – Security Header Level 1

S3A – Assurance Header Level 1

ST – Transaction Set Header

S4S – Security Header Level 2

S4A – Assurance Header Level 2

(The Transaction Set Segments)

SVA – Security Value Level 2

S4E – Security Trailer Level 2

SE - Transaction Set Trailer

SVA – Security Value (Level 1)

S3E – Security Trailer Level 1

GE – Functional Group Trailer

IEA - Interchange Trailer

For 003070 implementations, if encryption and/or authentication at both levels is provided and if assurances are used at both levels, the sequence of segments, illustrating these levels, is:

ISA – Interchange Header

(Other Groups whether secured or not at Level 1)

GS - Functional Group Header

S1S – Security Header Level 1

(Other Transaction Sets whether secured or not at Level 2)

ST - Transaction Set Header

S2S – Security Header Level 2

(The Transaction Set Segments)

S2A – Security Assurance Level 2

SVA – Assurance Token Level 2

(Other optional S2A-SVA pairs at Level 2

S2E – Security Trailer Level 2

SE - Transaction Set Trailer

(Other Transaction Sets whether secured or not at Level 2)

S1A – Assurance Segment Level 1

SVA – Assurance Token Level 1

(Other optional S1A–SVA pairs at Level 1)

S1E – Security Trailer Level 1

GE – Functional Group Trailer

(Other Functional Groups whether secured or not at Level 1)

IEA - Interchange Trailer

10.6 Interchange Control, Acknowledgment and Security Segment Specifications

This section contains the implementation conventions for the:

- Interchange Control Header (ISA), Version/release 004010
- Interchange Delivery Notice Segment (TA3)
- Functional Group Header (GS), Version/release 002003 and 003010
- Functional Group Header (GS), Version/releases 003040 through 003070
- Functional Group Header (GS), Version/release 004010
- Security Header Level 1 (S1S), Version/releases 003040 and 003050
- Security Header Level 1 (S1S), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Header Level 1 (S3S), Version/release 004010
- Assurance Header Level 1(S3A), Version/release 004010
- Security Header Level 2 (S2S), Version/releases 003040 and 003050
- Security Header Level 2 (S2S), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Header Level 2 (S4S), Version/release 004010
- Security Assurance Level 2 (S2A), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Assurance Header Level 2 (S4A), Version/release 004010
- Assurance Token Level 2 (SVA), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Value Level 2 (SVA), Version/release 004010
- Security Trailer Level 2 (S2E), Version/releases 003040, 003050, 003060 and 003070
- Security Trailer Level 2 (S4E), Version/release 004010
- Assurance Segment Level 1 (S1A), Version/releases 003060 and 003070

- Assurance Token Level 1 (SVA), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Value Level 1 (SVA), Version/release 004010
- Security Trailer Level 1 (S1E), Version/releases 003060 and 003070
- Security Trailer Level 1 (S3E), Version/release 004010
- Functional Group Trailer (GE), Version/release 002003 through 004010
- Interchange Control Trailer (IEA), Version/release 002003 through 004010.

Segment: ISA Interchange Control Header

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose: To start and identify an interchange of zero or more functional groups and interchange-

related control segments

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes:

- 1. Use ASCII Hexadecimal 1D in the fourth byte of the Interchange Control Header. This first occurrence of an element separator dictates the value the translation software will employ throughout the interchange.
- 2. Use ASCII Hexadecimal 1C after ISA16. This first occurrence of a segment terminator dictates the value the translation software employs throughout the interchange.
- 3. See ISA16 for subelement separator usage.
- 4. The ISA segment represented here is valid for version 002003-004010.

Data Element Summary

	Def	Data	Dutu Ele	ment Summary		
	Ref. Des.	Data <u>Element</u>	Name		Attı	ributes
Must Use	ISA01	<u> </u>		formation Qualifier	M	ID 2/2
			00	No Authorization Information Present Information in IO2)	t (No N	Meaningful
			05	Department of Defense (DoD) Comm Identifier	unicat	ion
				Use to indicate the Department of De the information authorizer. Use this sender is not a DOD entity.		
			06	United States Federal Government Co Identifier	mmur	nication
				Use to indicate the Federal Governm information authorizer. Use this coosender is not a Federal Government	le even	
Must Use	ISA02	I02	Authorization In	formation	M	AN 10/10
			Information used	for additional identification or authorizati	ion of	the
				r or the data in the interchange; the type of	of info	rmation is set
			•	on Information Qualifier (I01) additional identification or authorizatio	n fon t	ha data in tha
			-	erwise, fill this field with blank characte		ne uuu in ine
				s recommended that the specific coding cartner data security officials to ensure p		_
Must Use	ISA03	103	Security Informa	ation Qualifier the type of information in the Security Info	M	ID 2/2
			00	No Security Information Present (No		

			01	Information in I04) Password
				Use based on trading partner agreement.
Must Use	ISA04	104	sender or the da Security Inform	mation M AN 10/10 ridentifying the security information about the interchange at a in the interchange; the type of information is set by the nation Qualifier (I03) the 00, fill this field with blank characters. Otherwise, enter a
				reed between Trading Partners.
Must Use	ISA05	105	Interchange II Qualifier to des sender or receiv	O Qualifier M ID 2/2 signate the system/method of code structure used to designate the ver ID element being qualified
				11) or DUNS+4 (Code 16) are preferred.
			01	Duns (Dun & Bradstreet)
			02	SCAC (Standard Carrier Alpha Code)
			04	IATA (International Air Transport Association)
			08	UCC EDI Communications ID (Comm ID)
			09 10	X.121 (CCITT) Department of Defense (DoD) Activity Address Code
			16	Duns Number With 4-Character Suffix
Must Use	ISA06	I06	Interchange Se	
			receiver ID to resender ID element. 1. Enter the identification.	ode published by the sender for other parties to use as the oute data to them; the sender always codes this value in the ent lentifier of the sender's translation point. and pad on the right with blanks.
Must Use	ISA07	105	Interchange II	
			-	signate the system/method of code structure used to designate the ver ID element being qualified
				1) or DUNS+4 (Code 16) are preferred.
			01	Duns (Dun & Bradstreet)
			02	SCAC (Standard Carrier Alpha Code)
			04	IATA (International Air Transport Association)
			08	UCC EDI Communications ID (Comm ID)
			09	X.121 (CCITT)
			10	Department of Defense (DoD) Activity Address Code
			16	Duns Number With 4-Character Suffix
Must Use	ISA08	107	used by the senuse this as a reconstruction. <i>Enter the ideand non-govern</i>	ode published by the receiver of the data; When sending, it is der as their sending ID, thus other parties sending to them will reiving ID to route data to them lentifier of the receiver's translation point (both government)
Must Use	ISA09	I08	Interchange D	ate M DT 6/6
			Date of the inte	-
			1. Express the was created.	UTC (previously known as GMT) date that this interchange

			2. Express the date	e in a six-position (YYMMDD) format.		
Must Use	ISA10	I09	Interchange Time	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	M	TM 4/4
			Time of the interch	ange		
			1. Express the UT	C (previously known as GMT) time tha	t this i	nterchange
			was created.			
3.6 4 TI	TG 4.11	T10		e in a four-position (HHMM) format.	3.6	ID 1/1
Must Use	ISAII	I10	O	rol Standards Identifier e agency responsible for the control star	M	ID 1/1
				losed by the interchange header and tra		isca by the
			U	U.S. EDI Community of ASC X12, T		and UCS
Must Use	ISA12	I11	Interchange Cont	rol Version Number	M	ID 5/5
			O	er covers the interchange control segme	nts	
			Use to identify the	ASC X12 version and release for the in	nterch	ange
				unctional group or transactions carrie	d withi	in the
			envelope.			
				0 Data Element Dictionary for acceptab		
Must Use	ISA13	I12	Interchange Cont		M	N0 9/9
				assigned by the interchange sender	• ,	
				ies may use any numbering scheme co However, the scheme must uniquely t		
			-	very long period of time.	шениј.	y each
Must Use	ISA14	I13	Acknowledgment	• • •	M	ID 1/1
			Code sent by the se	ender to request an interchange acknowl	edgme	nt (TA1)
			1 0	knowledgment applies only to return o	•	
			- C	owledgment. It does not apply to other		0
				action set 242) as required by Part 10 of the TA1 is not supported, no acknowle		
			requested.	the 1A1 is not supported, no acknowle	agmer	u snau be
			0	No Acknowledgment Requested		
				Use this code to indicate an intercha	nge	
				acknowledgment via TA1 shall not b		rned by the
				interchange receiver.		
Must Use	ISA15	I14	Test Indicator	had a day and a dhada day and an	M	ID 1/1
			production	hether data enclosed by this interchange	envel	ope is test or
			P	Production Data		
				Use to identify all data other than te	st data	
			T	Test Data		
			-	Use when testing interchanges.		
				cso when tosting theoretically cs.		

Must Use ISA16 I15 Component Element Separator

M AN 1/1

Type is not applicable; the component element separator is a delimiter and not a data element; this field provides the delimiter used to separate component data elements within a composite data structure; this value must be different than the data element separator and the segment terminator

- 1. Prior to version/release 3020 there were no component elements defined in the standard; however, the standard accommodated their future existence. It has no meaning for translation in those versions of the standard that do not have defined composite data elements. For versions that do not have composite date elements a blank character will be entered for this data element.
- 2. Enter ASCII Hexadecimal 1F. The value of this element dictates the value the translation software employs for component element separation throughout the interchange.

Segment: TA3 Interchange Delivery Notice Segment

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose: To provide a notice from the receiving service request handler to the sending service

request handler that an interchange was delivered or not delivered to the interchange receiver's mailbox, or some other ancillary service was performed, and that the

interchange receiver retrieved, refused, or purged the interchange; TA3 is exchanged only

between service request handlers; use of the TA3 segment is optional

Syntax Notes: 1 If either TA322 or TA323 is present, then the other is required.

- 2 If either TA324 or TA325 is present, then the other is required.
- **3** If either TA326 or TA327 is present, then the other is required.

Semantic Notes:

- 1 TA301 and TA302 identify the service request handlers processing the interchange being reported.
- 2 TA304 through TA311 and TA318 through TA321 are used to identify the interchange whose status is being reported.
- 3 TA312 through TA314 identify the action being reported and the date and time that action was performed. TA315 through TA317 provide a second set of interchange action code, date and time that can be included if a given TA3 is reporting on more than one event.
- **4** TA322 through TA327 contain optional information exchanged by service request handlers to supply additional information concerning actions taken upon the interchange being reported.

Comments:

Notes:

- 1. Only one interchange action may be reported per TA3. If multiple events are to be reported, multiple TA3s must be used.
- 2. Only one interchange control structure error may be reported per TA3. If multiple errors are to be reported, multiple TA3s must be used.

Data Element Summary

	Ref.	Data		•			
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>		Att	<u>ributes</u>	
Must Use	TA301	I38	Service Request I	Iandler ID Qualifier	M	ID 2/2	
			This is a code iden	tifying the service request handler			
			Cite the code FG t	o indicate the Federal Government. To	comp	oly with X12	
			syntax, do so whet	her the originator is a public or private	organ	ization.	
Must Use	TA302	I39	Service Request I	Iandler ID	M	AN 1/15	
			This is the identified	cation code of the sending service reques	st hand	ller	
			Cite the DUNS or DUNS+4 of the service request handler providing this notice of interchange delivery.				
Must Use	TA303	I43	Error Reason Co	de	M	ID 3/3	
			The code indicates	the error found or not found in processi	ng the	control	
			structure or in deli-	very			
			000	No Errors			
			001	The Interchange Control Number in the	he Hea	der and	
				Trailer Do not Match; the Value from	the H	eader is used	
				in the Acknowledgment			
			002	This Standard as Noted in the Control	l Stanc	lards	
				Identifier is not Supported			
			003	This Version of the Controls is not Su	ipporte	ed	
			004	The Segment Terminator is Invalid			
			005	Invalid Value as Shown in the Report	ed Inte	erchange	
				Control Number		Č	

			006	Invalid Value as Shown in the Reported Interchange Date
			007	Invalid Value as Shown in the Reported Interchange
			008	Time Invalid Value as Shown in the Reported Interchange
			009	Sender ID Qualifier Invalid Value as Shown in the Reported Interchange Sender ID
			010	Invalid Value as Shown in the Reported Interchange Receiver ID Qualifier
			011	Invalid Value as Shown in the Reported Interchange Receiver ID
			016	Trading Partnership not Established
			017	Invalid Number of Included Groups Value
			018	Invalid Control Structure
			019	Improper (Premature) End-of-file (Transmission)
			020	Duplicate Interchange Control Number
			021	Invalid Data Element Separator
			022	Invalid Component Element Separator
			023	Failure to Transfer Interchange to the next Service
			023	Request Handler
			031	Receiver Not On-line
			032	Abnormal Conditions
Must Use	TA304	I44	Reported Star	t Segment ID M AN 2/3
				ne start segment ID of the original interchange, functional group
			or transaction s	
	TA305	T 45		EX12 interchanges, the start segment ID is always ISA.
	I A MIN			4 1 NT 1 NT A NT 1/1 /
Must Use	111505	I45		trol Number M AN 1/14
Must Use	111000	145		trol Number M AN 1/14 rol number value of the original interchange, functional group or
Must Use	111000	145	This is the cont transaction set <i>Cite the contro</i>	rol number value of the original interchange, functional group or l number assigned in the original interchange control header
Must Use	111000	145	This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in 1	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control
			This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope.
Must Use	TA306	145 146	This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date	I number value of the original interchange, functional group or I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8
			This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date This is the date	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group
			This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date This is the date	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice
			This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice led. M AN 1/8
Must Use	TA306	146	This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time This is the time	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group
Must Use	TA306	146	This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time This is the time	Inumber assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice led. M AN 1/8 e value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice opearing in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice
Must Use	TA306	146	This is the cont transaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Tarendament This is the date Cite the date apis being provid Reported Time Cite the time apis being provid Reported Interview Int	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group opearing in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. Popearing in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. Popearing in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. Popearing Sender ID Qualifier M AN 1/4
Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307	I46 I47	This is the contransaction set Cite the contro (appearing in It number, the TA Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time This is the time Cite the time ap is being provid Reported Inter This is the send	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) E M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) E value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) The change Sender ID Qualifier (M) AN 1/4 Her ID qualifier value appearing in original interchange
Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307	I46 I47	This is the contransaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the TA Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time Cite the time ap is being provid Reported Inter This is the send Cite the value of	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 evalue of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. Preparing in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The change Sender ID Qualifier of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The preparing in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The preparing in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed.
Must Use Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307 TA308	146 147 148	This is the contransaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the TA Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time This is the time Cite the time ap is being provid Reported Inter This is the send Cite the value of notice is being	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The change Sender ID Qualifier M AN 1/4 der ID qualifier value appearing in original interchange for which delivery provided.
Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307	I46 I47	This is the contransaction set Cite the contro (appearing in I number, the Ta Reported Date This is the date Cite the date ap is being provid Reported Time This is the time Cite the time ap is being provid Reported Inter This is the send Cite the value of notice is being Reported Send	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. E M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. E Value of original interchange or functional group operaring in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. E VALUE OF CONTROL OF THE INTERCHANGE OF WHICH DELIVERY NOTICE ED (AD AN 1/4) appearing in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. M AN 1/35
Must Use Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307 TA308	146 147 148	This is the control transaction set Cite the control (appearing in Innumber, the Tarendament This is the date appeared Date Cite the date appeared Time This is the time appeared Interest This is the send Cite the value of notice is being Reported Send This is the Send This Indiana This In	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) Evalue of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) The presenting in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) The presenting in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) The presenting in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) The presenting in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice (ed.) The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. The presenting in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided.
Must Use Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307 TA308	146 147 148	This is the control transaction set Cite the control (appearing in Innumber, the Tarendament Innumber, the Tarendament In Innumber, the date and is being provided Reported Interest In Innumber, the send Cite the value of the Innumber In Innumber Innumber In	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The change Sender ID Qualifier of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The provided of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of original interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided.
Must Use Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307 TA308	146 147 148	This is the control transaction set Cite the control (appearing in Innumber, the Tarendament Innumber, the Tarendament In Innumber, the date appeared This is the time appeared Intervalue of the Value of the Valu	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. Prehange Sender ID Qualifier M AN 1/4 der ID qualifier value appearing in original interchange appearing in ISA05 of the interchange for which delivery provided. M AN 1/35 der ID M AN 1/35 der ID value of original interchange or functional group appearing in ISA06 of the interchange for which delivery provided. M AN 1/4 M AN 1/4
Must Use Must Use Must Use	TA306 TA307 TA308	146 147 148	This is the control transaction set Cite the control (appearing in Innumber, the Tarendament Innumber, the Tarendament In Innumber, the Tarendament In Innumber, the Tarendament In Innumber, the Tarendament In Institute	I number assigned in the original interchange control header (SA13) for which notice is being provided. With this control (A3 is linked to the original interchange envelope. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA09 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. M AN 1/8 value of original interchange or functional group operating in ISA10 of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The change Sender ID Qualifier of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The provided of the interchange for which delivery notice ed. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of original interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided. The provided of the interchange for which delivery provided.

3.5 4.77	TI 4 2 4 4	T#4	notice is being pro			4 3 1 4 10 F
Must Use	1A311	I51	Reported Receive		M	AN 1/35
				r ID value of original interchange or func		
				earing in ISA08 of the interchange for	which	delivery
M4 II	TIA 212	T40	notice is being pro	ovided.	N	TD 2/2
Must Use	1A312	I40	Action Code	eating the action taken on the interchange	M	ID 2/2
				cating the action taken on the interchange test handler or the receiver	or ru	netional group
			AK	Transfer to the Next Service Request 1	Handl	ar has baan
			AK	Acknowledged	Tanui	ci ilas occii
			ВН	Transfer to Service Request Handler n	ot Ca	nable of
			D11	Reporting Further Status	iot cu _j	public of
			DL	Delivered Interchange by Service Req	uest F	Iandler
			PU	Purged by Interchange Receiver	•	
			RD	Redirected by Service Request Handle	er to a	n Δlternate
			RD	Receiver as Identified in the Reference		
			RF	Refused by Interchange Receiver	e cou.	C
			RJ	Rejected by Service Request Handler;	Soo F	Error Passon
			ΙΧJ	Code for Cause	SCC L	aror Reason
			RT	Retrieved Interchange by Receiver		
			TR	Transferred to Next Service Request F	- Handle	er by Service
			110	Request Handler, but not yet Acknowl		•
Must Use	TA313	I41	Action Date	1 , ,	M	DT 6/6
			This is the UTC da	ate when the service request handler took	action	n on the
			reported interchan	ge or functional group		
				(previously known as GMT) date in a six	x-posi	tion
			(YYMMDD) form	at.		
Must Use	TA314	I42	Action Time	1 4 2 4 1 1 4 1	M	TM 4/6
				me when the service request handler took ge or functional group	actioi	n on the
				ge of functional group (previously known as GMT) time in a fo	ur_no	sition
			(HHMM) format.	(previously known as Gill) time in a jo	ит-ро	siiioii
Not Used	TA315	I40	Action Code		О	ID 2/2
			This is a code indi-	cating the action taken on the interchange	e or fu	nctional group
			by the service requ	nest handler or the receiver		
			Refer to 003070 D	ata Element Dictionary for acceptable co	de val	lues.
Not Used	TA316	I41	Action Date		O	DT 6/6
				ate when the service request handler took	action	n on the
			-	ge or functional group		
Not Used	TA317	I42	Action Time		0	TM 4/6
				me when the service request handler took	actioi	n on the
Not Used	TA318	I52	First Reference II	ge or functional group	O	AN 1/4
Not Oseu	1A316	152		ifier appearing in original interchange	U	AN 1/4
No4 Used	TA 210	152	=		0	A NI 1/14
Not Used	TA319	I53	First Reference II	rmation from the original interchange, as	O	AN 1/14
			Reference ID Qual		deline	d by the first
Not Used	TA320	I54	Second Reference		0	AN 1/4
Not escu	111320	154		ualifier information appearing in original	_	
Not Used	TA321	I55	Second Reference		O	AN 1/14
1101 USEU	111321	133		emation from the original interchange, as	_	
				ID Qualifier data element	J. 1111C	0 , 1110
	TA322	I56	Reference Code (=	X	ID 2/2
	·	~		C		

			This is a code defining the information contained in the Reference	rence	e Code data
			If TA312 is code RD, use TA322 and TA323 to identify the which the interchange was redirected.	orga	nization to
			O5 ID of Alternate Receiver to which Interest Redirected	chang	ge Has Been
	TA323	I57	Reference Code	\mathbf{X}	AN 1/35
			This contains reference information exchanged between servi handlers concerning the reported interchange as defined by the Reference Code Qualifier data element		-
			Cite the identifier of the organization to which the interchai		
			redirected. The organization shall be identified via a uniqu		
			one of the sources listed as allowable codes in the ISA05 de		
			10.6 of the Federal EDI Guidelines. The Data Universal Nu (DUNS) number and DUNS+4 are the preferred identifiers.		ering System
Not Used	TA324	I56	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Х	ID 2/2
	-		This is a code defining the information contained in the Reference	rence	e Code data
Not Used	TA325	I57	Reference Code	X	AN 1/35
			This contains reference information exchanged between servi	ice re	equest
			handlers concerning the reported interchange as defined by the Reference Code Qualifier data element	ie co	rresponding
Not Used	TA326	I56		\mathbf{X}	ID 2/2
			This is a code defining the information contained in the Reference element	rence	Code data
Not Used	TA327	I57	Reference Code	X	AN 1/35
			This contains reference information exchanged between servi	ice re	equest
			handlers concerning the reported interchange as defined by the Reference Code Qualifier data element	ie co	rresponding

Segment: GS Functional Group Header

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

Purpose: To

To indicate the beginning of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

The data interchange control number GS06 in this header must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group trailer, GE02.

Comments:

A functional group of related transaction sets, within the scope of X12 standards, consists of a collection of similar transaction sets enclosed by a functional group header and a functional group trailer.

Notes:

- 1. Use to identify the functional group containing one or more related transactions.
- 2. Use to identify the specific implementation convention with which the transaction sets contained within the functional group envelope comply.
- 3. The version and release of the GS segment must be the same as the version and release of the transactions that follow it as specified in the Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code (GS08).
- 4. The GS segment represented here is valid for version 002003 and 003010.

Data Element Summary

	Ref.	Data	·			
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>	Attributes		
Must Use	GS01	479	Functional Identifier Code	M ID 2/2		
			Code identifying a group of application related transaction s	sets		
			Cite any valid code defined for data element 479 within the standard version/release under which the transaction set it example, the 002030 Standards Data Element Dictionary any Federal or DoD implementation convention that exist based upon the 002030 standard. New codes available in standard and not available in the 002030 standard could not 2030 based implementation convention.	s prepared. For may be used for s and was created the 003010		
Must Use	GS02	142	Application Sender's Code Code identifying party sending transmission.	M AN 2/12		
			 Cite the sending application's identifier. This identifier within the domain of the sending application's translation Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS) is recommended to puniqueness. Transmit the required number of characters without leblanks. 	point. Use of a provide universal		
Must Use	GS03	124	Application Receiver's Code Code identifying party receiving transmission	M AN 2/12		
			 Cite the receiving application's identifier. This identifier must be unit within the domain of the receiving application's translation point. Use of Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS) is recommended to provide universuniqueness. Transmit the required number of characters without leading or trailing blanks. 			
			3. If the group contains PUBLIC transactions, enter the l	iterai string		

			'PUBLIC'.			
Must Use	GS04	29	Data Interchange Date		M	DT 6/6
			_	nctional group of transaction sets.		
			created.	sly known as GMT) date that thi x-position (YYMMDD) format.	is segi	nent was
Must Use	GS05	30	Data Interchange Time	r-position (11mm2) formut.	M	TM 4/4
			Time (HHMM) when the s	ender generated a functional grou	ıp of t	ransaction
			sets (local time at sender's		•	
			created.	sly known as GMT) time that thi	is segi	ment was
Must Use	GS06	28	2. Express the time in a for Data Interchange Contro	ur-position (HHMM) format.	M	N0 1/9
Must Osc	G 500	20	_	d and maintained by the sender	171	110 1/2
				nay use any numbering scheme c	consis	tent with
			group. The Group Control	de sufficient uniqueness to ident Number value, together with th odes, shall be unique within an e	e App	lication
			frame - such as a year.			
Must Use	GS07	455	Responsible Agency Code		M	ID 1/2
			standard	with Data Element 480 to identify	tne is	ssuer of the
				edited Standards Committee X12		
Must Use	GS08	480	EDI standard being used.	n, release, subrelease, and industry Positions 1-3, Major Version Num Positions 7-12, Industry or Trade	nber;	Positions 4-6,
				nplementation Convention, based by the government has a unique		
			Positions 1 through 6:	ANSI ASC X12 Version and I number (e.g. 003010) upon w. IC is based.		
			Position 7:	Organizational Scope A = APADE		
				F = Federal		
				D = DOD		
				G = Government (Intern R = Rework	nal)	
				1 = MADES I		
				2 = MADES II		
				5 = SACONS 2.5 6 = SACONS 2.6		
			Positions 8 through 10:	Transaction Set Identifier Code (e.g. 850).	2	

Position 11: Derivative: A character used to define the

functionality of a specific implementation of a

transaction set.

If the convention is not a variant, an underscore (_) will appear in this

position.

Position 12: A sequential number starting with 0

and incremented by 1 each time the implementation convention is revised.

Segment: GS Functional Group Header

Usage: Mandato

Max Use:

Purpose: To indicate the beginning of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

- **1** GS04 is the group date.
- **2** GS05 is the group time.
- 3 The data interchange control number GS06 in this header must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group trailer, GE02.

Comments:

A functional group of related transaction sets, within the scope of X12 standards, consists of a collection of similar transaction sets enclosed by a functional group header and a functional group trailer.

Notes:

- 1. Use to identify the functional group containing one or more related transactions.
- 2. Use to identify the specific implementation convention with which the transaction sets contained within the functional group envelope comply.
- 3. The version and release of the GS segment must be the same as the version and release of the transactions that follow it as specified in the Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code (GS08).
- 4. The GS segment represented here is valid for version 003040 through 003070.

	Ref.	Data					
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>	Attributes			
Must Use	GS01	479	Functional Identifier Code	M ID 2/2			
			Code identifying a group of application related transaction s	ets			
			Cite any valid code defined for data element 479 within the	ASC X12			
			standard version/release under which the transaction set is	prepared. For			
			example, the 003040 Standards Data Element Dictionary i	-			
			any Federal or DoD implementation convention that exists				
			based upon the 003040 standard. New codes available in t				
			standard and not available in the 003040 standard could n	ot be used in a			
3.5 4.77	GG03	1.40	003040 based implementation convention.	35 431045			
Must Use	GS02	142	Application Sender's Code	M AN 2/15			
			Code identifying party sending transmission; codes agreed to by trading				
			partners 1. Cite the sending application's identifier. This identifier	must ha uniqua			
			within the domain of the sending application's translation	=			
			Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS or DUNS+4) is recom	- "			
			universal uniqueness.	mended to provide			
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without led	iding or trailing			
			blanks.				
Must Use	GS03	124	Application Receiver's Code	M AN 2/15			
			Code identifying party receiving transmission. Codes agreed	to by trading			
			partners				
			1. Cite the receiving application's identifier. This identifie	_			
			within the domain of the receiving application's translation	•			
			Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS or DUNS+4) is recom	mended to provide			
			universal uniqueness.				

			blanks.	umber of characters without le	_	_
			3. If the group contains PU'PUBLIC'.	UBLIC transactions, enter the l	iteral	string
Must Use	GS04	373	Date Date (YYMMDD)		M	DT 6/6
			1. Enter the UTC (previous created.	sly known as GMT) date that th	is seg	ment was
Must Use	GS05	337	2. Express the date in a six Time	-position (YYMMDD) format.	M	TM 4/8
Must osc	GBV5	331	Time expressed in 24-hour HHMMSSD, or HHMMSSD 59), S = integer seconds (00 are expressed as follows: D 1. Enter the UTC (previous	clock time as follows: HHMM, a DD, where H = hours (00-23), N 0-59) and DD = decimal seconds = tenths (0-9) and DD = hundre sly known as GMT) time that the	or HE I = m ; deci	HMMSS, or sinutes (00-imal seconds (00-99)
			created.			
Must Use	GS06	28	2. Express the time in a for Group Control Number	ur-position (HHMM) format.	M	N0 1/9
Wast esc	GDUU	20	Assigned number originated	d and maintained by the sender		
			1. Originating activities matheir business practices.	ay use any numbering scheme o	consis	stent with
			group. The Group Control	de sufficient uniqueness to iden Number value, together with th odes, shall be unique within an	e App	plication
Must Use	GS07	455	Responsible Agency Code		M	ID 1/2
			standard	rith Data Element 480 to identify	the i	ssuer of the
Must Use	GS08	480	X Accred Version / Release / Industr	dited Standards Committee X12	M	AN 1/12
Must Use	GSVo	400	Code indicating the version EDI standard being used, in in GS segment is X, then in positions 4-6 are the release 7-12 are the industry or traduser); if code in DE455 in CEach Federal and DoD Imp	ry Identifier Code , release, subrelease, and industrictuding the GS and GE segment DE 480 positions 1-3 are the very and subrelease, level of the very least association identifiers (options GS segment is T, then other form plementation Convention, base by the government has a unique	y idents; if consideration; ally asternation of the consideration of the	ntifier of the code in DE455 number; and positions ssigned by re allowed an ANSI ASC
			Positions 1 through 6:	ANSI ASC X12 Version and number (e.g. 003010) upon w IC is based.		
			Position 7:	Organizational Scope A = APADE F = Federal D = DOD G = Government (Inter R = Rework	nal)	

1 = MADES I 2 = MADES II 5 = SACONS 2.5 6 = SACONS 2.6

Positions 8 through 10: Transaction Set Identifier Code

(e.g. 850).

Position 11: Derivative: A character used to define the

functionality of a specific implementation of a

transaction set.

If the convention is not a variant, an underscore (_) will appear in this

position.

Position 12: A sequential number starting with 0

and incremented by 1 each time the implementation convention is revised.

Segment: GS Functional Group Header

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

To indicate the beginning of a functional group and to provide control information

Purpose: Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

- 1 GS04 is the group date.
- **2** GS05 is the group time.
- 3 The data interchange control number GS06 in this header must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group trailer, GE02.

Comments:

Dof

Data

A functional group of related transaction sets, within the scope of X12 standards, consists of a collection of similar transaction sets enclosed by a functional group header and a functional group trailer.

Notes:

- 1. Use to identify the functional group containing one or more related transactions.
- 2. Use to identify the specific implementation convention with which the transaction sets contained within the functional group envelope comply.
- 3. The version and release of the GS segment must be the same as the version and release of the transactions that follow it as specified in the Version / Release / Industry Identifier Code (GS08).
- 4. The GS segment represented here is valid for version 004010.

Ref.	Data				
Des.	Element	<u>Name</u> <u>A</u>	ttributes		
GS01	479	Functional Identifier Code M	I ID 2/2		
		Code identifying a group of application related transaction sets			
		Cite any valid code defined for data element 479 within the ASC X12 standard version/release under which the transaction set is prepared. For example, the 004010 Standards Data Element Dictionary may be used for any Federal or DoD implementation convention that exists and was created based upon the 004010 standard			
GS02	142	Application Sender's Code M	I AN 2/15		
		Code identifying party sending transmission; codes agreed to b partners	y trading		
		within the domain of the sending application's translation po Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS or DUNS+4) is recommo universal uniqueness.	int. Use of a ended to provide		
GS03	124	Code identifying party receiving transmission. Codes agreed to			
		1. Cite the receiving application's identifier. This identifier mithin the domain of the receiving application's translation p Dun and Bradstreet number (DUNS or DUNS+4) is recommuniversal uniqueness.	oint. Use of a ended to provide		
	Des. GS01	Des. Element GS01 479	GS01 Same Functional Identifier Code Mark		

			3. If the group contains P'PUBLIC'.	UBLIC transactions, enter the lit	eral string	
Must Use	GS04	373	Date Date (CCYYMMDD)		M DT 8/8	
				sly known as GMT) date that this	segment was	
			equals the hundred-years the month value, and 'DD	-	e, 'MM' equals	
Must Use	GS05	337	HHMMSSD, or HHMMSS 59), S = integer seconds (00 are expressed as follows: D	clock time as follows: HHMM, or BDD, where H = hours (00-23), M 0-59) and DD = decimal seconds; D = tenths (0-9) and DD = hundred sty known as GMT) time that this	= minutes (00- decimal second ths (00-99)	s
			2. Express the time in a fo	ur-position (HHMM) format.		
Must Use	GS06	28	Group Control Number	d and maintained by the sender	M N0 1/9	
				ay use any numbering scheme co	nsistent with	
			their business practices.			
			group. The Group Control	de sufficient uniqueness to identi Number value, together with the odes, shall be unique within an ex	Application	nal
Must Use	GS07	455	Responsible Agency Code		M ID 1/2	
			Code used in conjunction v standard	with Data Element 480 to identify t	he issuer of the	
3.5	GGAA	400		dited Standards Committee X12	35 137446	
Must Use	GS08	480	EDI standard being used, in in GS segment is X, then in positions 4-6 are the release 7-12 are the industry or tracuser); if code in DE455 in <i>Each Federal and DoD In</i>	ry Identifier Code a, release, subrelease, and industry including the GS and GE segments. The DE 480 positions 1-3 are the verse and subrelease, level of the versical deassociation identifiers (optional GS segment is T, then other forman in the plementation Convention, based by the government has a unique in	if code in DE4 ion number; on; and position ly assigned by ts are allowed on an ANSI AS	.55 ns
			Positions 1 through 6:	ANSI ASC X12 Version and R number (e.g. 003010) upon wh IC is based.		
			Position 7:	Organizational Scope A = APADE F = Federal D = DOD G = Government (Intern R = Rework	al)	

1 = MADES I 2 = MADES II 5 = SACONS 2.5 6 = SACONS 2.6

Positions 8 through 10: Transaction Set Identifier Code

(e.g. 850).

Position 11: Derivative: A character used to define the

functionality of a specific implementation of a

transaction set.

If the convention is not a variant, an underscore (_) will appear in this

position.

Position 12: A sequential number starting with 0

and incremented by 1 each time the implementation convention is revised.

Segment: S1S Security Header Level 1

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for

authentication or encryption of a functional group

Syntax Notes: 1 If either S1S04 or S1S05 is present, then the other is required.

2 If any of S1S06 S1S07 S1S08 or S1S09 is present, then all are required.

Semantic Notes: 1 If S1S01 is ``AA" or ``BB", S1S04 is required.

If S1S01 is "BB" or "EE", S1S06 is required.

Comments:

Notes:

1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the

uniqueness of the identifier

2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier

3. The S1S segment represented here is only valid for versions 003040 and 003050.

	Ref.	Data			
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>	<u>Att</u>	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	S1S01	990	Security Type	M	ID 2/2
			Code identifying the security algorithms and methods employed	oyed f	for this level of
			interchange.		
			EE Encryption, No Authentication		
Must Use	S1S02	824	Security Originator Name	M	AN 4/16
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process t	-	
			authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or o	origin	ates a
			cryptographic service message		
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the secu		
			mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X1	2 to g	guarantee the
Manual II.	G1G02	925	uniqueness of the identifier	3.7	A NI 4/17
Must Use	S1S03	825	Security Recipient Name Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process t	M hot no	AN 4/16
			authentication or decryption on received data, or is the desti		
			cryptographic service message	пано	ii 01 a
			cryptographic service message		
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the secu	ıritv r	ecipient: no
			mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X1		
			uniqueness of the identifier		
Not Used	S1S04	991	Authentication Key Name	\mathbf{X}	AN 1/16
			Name of the key used for authentication. This name is mutu	ally k	nown to the
			security originator and the security recipient, is unique for the	nis re	lationship, and
			allows a particular key to be specified.		
Not Used	S1S05	992	Authentication Service Code	X	ID 1/1
			Authentication option		
Must Use	S1S06	993	Encryption Key Name	X	AN 1/16
			Name of the key used for encryption. This name is mutually		
			security originator and the security recipient, is unique for the	nis re	lationship, and
			allows a particular key to be specified.		
Must Use	S1S07	994	If FORTEZZA is to be used, SKIPJACK is specified here. Encryption Service Code	X	ID 1/3
Must ose	91901	77 4	Encryption Service Code	А	10 1/3

Coded values representing options for encryption processing. The code defines the encryption mode and the transmission filter specification for filtering binary ciphertext data into transmittable text.

	Use to specify hexadecimal filtered SKIPJACK.
ZZ	Mutually Defined
42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), ASCII Filter
	Filter
41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), Hexadecimal
	Filter
22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), ASCII
	Hexadecimal Filter
21	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC),

Must Use S1S08

995 Length of Data (LOD)

996

X N 1/18

Length of data is the number of character positions of the encrypted, filtered text.

If SKIPJACK is specified in the S1S07, the length of data includes the length of the Initialization Vector (S1S09).

Must Use S1S09

Initialization Vector (IV)

X AN 16/16

The archival representation of a 64-bit value expressed in hexadecimal notation as 16 ASCII characters from the set of characters (0..9, A..F); the 64-bit value is used as a starting point for encryption of a data sequence to increase security by introducing cryptographic variance and to synchronize cryptographic equipment; a new Initialization Vector (IV) shall be used for each message; the IV shall not be intentionally reused; the 64-bit binary value, not its ASCII representation, is used for the cryptographic process; in the interchange process, the resultant encrypted and filtered 64-bit IV is sent; the hexadecimal notation is the representation for archiving purposes; the IV shall be a random or pseudo-random number; when encrypted, the IV must be decrypted using the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode and the same key used to encrypt the message

- 1. Although the current 16 byte Initialization Vector (S1S09) was designed to support DES (ANSI X9.23) encryption, the SKIPJACK algorithm can be used. SKIPJACK requires a 24 byte S1S09 field. If SKIPJACK is specified in the S1S07, sixteen ASCII 'F' characters are entered in the S1S09 field. This sets all the bits high in this field. A segment terminator follows the S1S09 field. Immediately following the segment terminator will be a 24 byte S1S09 field and the SKIPJACK encrypted data. There is no data element separator between the S1S09 and the encrypted data. An S1E (security trailer), the ASCII character 'Z' and the segment terminator follow the SKIPJACK encrypted data.
- 2. If a transaction is encrypted at the group level, the ST and SE will be encrypted and not accessible.

Segment: S1S Security Header Level 1

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

Notes:

Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for

authentication or encryption of a functional group

Syntax Notes: 1 If either S1S04 or S1S05 is present, then the other is required.

- If any of S1S06 S1S07 S1S08 or S1S09 is present, then all are required.
- 3 If either C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required.
- 4 If either C03206 or C03207 is present, then the other is required.

Semantic Notes: 1 If \$1\$01 is "AA", "BB", "AC" or "BC", then \$1\$04 is required.

If \$1\$01 is "BB", "EF", "AC" or "FC", then \$1\$06 is required.

If S1S01 is "BB", "EE", "AC" or "EC", then S1S06 is required.

Comments: X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1S02 (see

- 1 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1S02 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1S03 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 3 In S1S04, the special name "01234567890ABCDEF" is reserved for the hexadecimal value 01234567890ABCDEF (i.e., a fixed, nonsecret value) to provide a well-known value for data-integrity testing only.
- 1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier
- 2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S1S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier
- 3. The S1S segment represented here is only valid for versions 003060 and 003070.

	Ref.	Data		<i>y</i>			
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>		Attributes		
Must Use	S1S01	990	Security Type		M ID 2/2		
			Code identifying t	he security algorithms and methods applie	d for this level of		
			interchange				
			EC	No Authentication, Compression, Encr	yption		
			EE	No Authentication, No Compression, E	Encryption		
Must Use	S1S02	824	Security Originator Name Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or originates a cryptographic service message				
	S1S03	825					
2.200			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or decryption on received data, or is the destination of a cryptographic service message				
	G4 G0.4	204	mechanism, or reg uniqueness of the		2 to guarantee the		
Not Used	S1S04	991	Authentication K	ey Name	X AN 1/64		

	Name of the key used for authentication; this name is mutually known to security originator and the security recipient, is unique for this relationsh is intended to allow the changing of the key from time to time					
			Note: The special key name "0123456789ABCDEF" is reserved for hexidecimal value 0123456789ABCDEF (i.e. a fixed non-secret value)			
			provide a well-known value for data integrity testing only)	,		
Not Used	S1S05	992	Authentication Service Code Authentication options	X ID 1/1		
Must Use	S1S06	C031	Encryption Key Information	X		
			Information needed to identify or obtain the encryption key			
Must Use	C03101	993	993 Encryption Key Name Name of the key used for encryption; this name is mutually known to the security originator and the security recipient, is unique for this relation is intended to allow the changing of the key from time to time			
			Note: If any of the optional fields are present, the Key Name should either "PUBLIC" if a public key is being used to encrypt the one-tin the actual name of the asymmetric key-encrypting-key used to encry	ne key or		
			time key.			
			If FORTEZZA is to be used, SKIPJACK is specified here.			
	C03102	1564	Protocol ID	O ID 3/3		
			Code specifying protocol used to encrypt the session key			
			KEA Key Encryption Algorithm			
			RSA RSA Algorithm			
	C03103	1565	Look-up Value	O AN		
			Value used to identify a certificate containing the public key used to one-time key	1/512 encrypt the		
	C03104	1566	Keying Material	O AN 1/512		
			Additional material required for decrypting the one-time key	1/512		
			For SKIPJACK users, the Randomized value (Ra) is placed in this	s data element		
			in hexadecimal format.			
	C03105	1567	One-time Encryption Key	O AN 1/512		
			Hexadecimally filtered encrypted one-time key			
Must Use	S1S07	C032	Encryption Service Information	X		
			Information required by the encryption operation			
Must Use C03201 994		994	Encryption Service Code M ID 1/3 Coded values representing options for encryption processing, including the use of compression and filtering; the code either defines the encryption mode and the transmission filter specification for filtering binary data into transmittable text or specifics that the following subelements define these values 21 ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC).			
			Hexadecimal Filter	SCII		
			22 ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), A Filter	SCII		
			41 ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), Hexac Filter	decimal		
			42 ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), ASCI	I Filter		
			ZZ Mutually Defined			

				Use to specify hexadecimal filtered SKIPJAC		
	C03202	1568	Algorithm ID		O	ID 3/3
			Algorithm used for	• 1		
			DE3	Triple DEA		
			DES	Data Encryption Standard (Same as DEA)		
				As specified in FIPS 46-2.		
			SKJ	Skipjack	_	
	C03203	1569	Algorithm Mode o	_	O	ID 3/3
			-	of the Encryption Algorithm		
	~~~~	4==0	CBC	Cipher Block Chaining		
	C03204	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3
				e type of filter used to convert data code values		
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
			ASC	ASCII Filter		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
			UUE	Uuencoding M. C. H. D. Cool		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined  Use to indicate Base 64.		
	C03205	700	Version Identifier	Use to indicate Base 04.	v	AN 1/30
	C03205	799		mantiaulan famusat, muaanama taahmiaus an alaanith		AN 1/30
	C03206	1571	Compression ID	particular format, program, technique or algorith		ID 3/3
	C03200	15/1	Type of Compression Used			ID 3/3
			913	X9E13 Compression as defined by X9.32		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Use to indicate that each block has been comp	ros	sod
				by using a combination of the Lempel-Ziv LZ		seu
				algorithm and Huffman coding, in accordance	e w	
				the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)	Req	uest
	C03207	799	Version Identifier	for Comments (RFC) 1951 format.	X	AN 1/30
	C05207	1,7,7		particular format, program, technique or algorith		11111/00
				the compression algorithm cited in S1S07 (C03		)
			above.	and compression anger annu cue an aller (coe		
Must Use	S1S08	995	Length of Data			N 1/18
			_	e number of character positions of the compresse		•
				ext; when data is plain text, this field shall be abs ecified in the S1S07, the length of data includes		lenoth
			of the Initialization			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Must Use	S1S09	996	Initialization Vector	or	X	AN
			The emphissed memore	entetion of a 64 hit value armaged in have design	1	16/16
			-	entation of a 64-bit value expressed in hexadecin ters from the set of characters (09, AF); the 64		
				point for encryption of a data sequence to increa		
				tographic variance and to synchronize cryptographic		
				nitialization Vector (IV) shall be used for each m		
				ntionally reused; the 64-bit binary value, not its A sed for the cryptographic process; in the interchar		Ш
			_	nt encrypted and filtered 64-bit IV is sent; the he	_	cimal
			-	esentation for archiving purposes; the IV shall be		
			or pseudo-random r	number; when encrypted, the IV must be decrypted	ed u	sing the

Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode and the same key used to encrypt the message

- 1. Although the current 16 byte Initialization Vector (S1S09) was designed to support DES (ANSI X9.23) encryption, the SKIPJACK algorithm can be used. SKIPJACK requires a 24 byte S1S09 field. If SKIPJACK is specified in the S1S07, sixteen ASCII 'F' characters are entered in the S1S09 field. This sets all the bits high in this field. A segment terminator follows the S1S09 field. Immediately following the segment terminator will be a 24 byte S1S09 field and the SKIPJACK encrypted data. There is no data element separator between the S1S09 and the encrypted data. An S1E (security trailer), the ASCII character 'Z' and the segment terminator follow the SKIPJACK encrypted data.
- 2. If a transaction is encrypted at the group level, the ST and SE will be encrypted and not accessible.

Segment: S3S Security Header Level 1

**Position:** 030

Loop:

Level:

**Semantic Notes:** 

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for

authentication or encryption of a functional group

**Syntax Notes:** 1 If either S3S05 or S3S06 is present, then the other is required.

2 If any of S3S08 S3S09 S3S10 or S3S11 is present, then all are required.

3 If any of C05005 C05006 C05007 or C05008 is present, then all are required.

4 If any of C05009 C05010 C05011 or C05012 is present, then all are required.

5 If either C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required.

6 If either C03206 or C03207 is present, then the other is required.

1 If S3S02 is "AA", "BB", "AC", or "BC", then S3S05 is required. If S3S02 is "BB", "EE", "AC", or "EC", then S3S08 is required.

If S3S02 is "CC" then S3S09 is required.

Comments: 1 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S3S03 (security originator).

No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.

2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S3S04 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.

3 In S3S05, the special name "01234567890ABCDEF" is reserved for the hexadecimal value 01234567890ABCDEF (i.e., a fixed, non-secret value) to provide a well-known value for data-integrity testing only.

Notes: The S3S segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

			Data Eleme	ni Summai y				
	Ref.	Data						
	Des.	<b>Element</b>	<u>Name</u>		<u>Attributes</u>			
Must Use	$\overline{S3S01}$	1621	Security Version/Re	elease Identifier Code	$\overline{M}$ ID $6/6$			
			Code indicating the v	rersion/release of the ASC X12 standar	rd that is being used			
			for this specific secur	rity structure. The version/release ident	tified for this			
			segment also applies	to any corresponding trailer or security	y value segment.			
			This version/release	s independent of any other version/rele	ease identified in			
			another security segn	nent at the transaction set or functional	group level. This			
			version/release is ind	ependent of the version/release identif	ied at the			
			interchange or function	interchange or functional group level				
			Refer to 004010 Data	Refer to 004010 Data Element Dictionary for acceptable code values.				
Must Use	S3S02	990	<b>Security Type Code</b>		M ID 2/2			
			Code identifying the	security algorithms and methods applied	ed for this level of			
			interchange					
			EC	No Authentication, Compression, Enc	ryption			
			EE	No Authentication, No Compression,	Encryption			
Must Use	S3S03	824	<b>Security Originator</b>	Name	M AN 1/64			
			Unique designation (	identity) of the cryptographic process t	that performs			
			authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or originates a					
			cryptographic service message					
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the security originator; no					
				ration method is provided by X9 or X1				
			meenamsm, or regist	ration method is provided by A) of A1	2 to guarantee the			

	S3S04	825	uniqueness of the Security Recipie		O AN 1/64	
			authentication or	on (identity) of the cryptographic process decryption on received data, or is the dest	•	
			cryptographic ser	rvice message		
NI-4 TII	6250F	001	mechanism, or re uniqueness of the		12 to guarantee the	
Not Used	S3S05	991	Authentication Name of the key	<b>key Name</b> used for authentication; this name is mutual	X AN 1/64 ally known to the	
				or and the security recipient, is unique for to ow the changing of the key from time to time		
			hexadecimal valu	al key name "0123456789ABCDEF" is resulted 0123456789ABCDEF (i.e. a fixed non-		
Not Used	S3S06	992	provide a well-ki <b>Authentication</b> Authentication of		X ID 1/1	
				Data Element Dictionary for acceptable co	ode values.	
	S3S07	C050	Certificate Lool	s-up Information	O	
				rmation related to or used for certificate id		
Must Use	C05001	1675	Look-up Value Protocol Code M ID 2/2 Code specifying the protocol used to identify a certificate			
				ended that both the AA and AC codes be usue identification of the certificate owner.		
				or AC is specified, AA must also be specifiue across domains.	ied. AB or AC only	
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name		
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name		
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number		
Must Use	C05002	1570	Filter ID Code		M ID 3/3	
			HDC	the type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter	values	
			R64	Radix 64		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Used to specify no filtering.		
Must Use	C05003	799	Version Identifi	er	M AN 1/30	
				a particular format, program, technique of	=	
Must Use	C05004	1565	Look-up Value	entify a certificate containing a public key	M AN 1/4096	
Must Use	C05005	1675	Look-up Value		X ID 2/2	
Wast est	202002	10.0		the protocol used to identify a certificate	11 12 2/2	
				ended that both the AA and AC codes be u		
			ensures the uniq	ue identification of the certificate owner.		
			-	or AC is specified, AA must also be specified.	ied. AB or AC only	
			may not be uniq	<i>ue across domains.</i> X509 Issuer Distinguished Name		
			AA AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name		
				-1007 Subject Distinguished I wille		

			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number			
Must Use	C05006	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3	
				the type of filter used to convert data cod	e value		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			R64	Radix 64			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
				Used to specify no filtering.			
Must Use	C05007	799	Version Identific		X	AN 1/30	
			Revision level of	a particular format, program, technique o	or algo	rithm	
Must Use	C05008	1565	Look-up Value Value used to ide	entify a certificate containing a public key	X	AN 1/4096	
	C05009	1675	Look-up Value l		X	ID 2/2	
			-	the protocol used to identify a certificate			
				nded that both the AA and AC codes be	used s	ince this	
			ensures the unique identification of the certificate owner.				
			=	r AC is specified, AA must also be speci ue across domains.	fied. A	AB or AC only	
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name			
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name			
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number			
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3	
			Code specifying t	the type of filter used to convert data cod	e value	es	
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			R64	Radix 64			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
				Used to specify no filtering.			
	C05011	<b>799</b>	Version Identific	er	X	AN 1/30	
			Revision level of	a particular format, program, technique of	or algo	rithm	
	C05012	1565	Look-up Value		X	AN 1/4096	
			Value used to ide	entify a certificate containing a public key	,		
Must Use	S3S08	C031	<b>Encryption Key</b>	Information	X		
			To provide inform	nation needed to identify or obtain the en	cryptic	on key	
Must Use	C03101	993	<b>Encryption Key</b>		M	AN 1/64	
				used for encryption; this name is mutuall			
				or and the security recipient, is unique for ow the changing of the key from time to t		iationship, and	
				ne optional fields are present, the Key Na			
				if a public key is being used to encrypt to the asymmetric key-encrypting-key use			
			time key.	if the asymmetric key enerypting key use	u to cii	erypt the one	
				s to be used, SKIPJACK is specified here	е.		
	C03102	1564	Protocol ID		0	ID 3/3	
			Code anasifying	mustocal used to an amount the session from			
			Code specifying j	protocol used to encrypt the session key			
			KEA	Key Encryption Algorithm			

			Additional material	required for decrypting the one-time ke	y		
				ers, the Randomized value (Ra) is place	ed in	this data	
	~~~.		element in hexadec	•			
	C03104	1567	One-time Encrypti		O	AN 1/512	
				red encrypted one-time key			
Must Use	S3S09	C032	Encryption Service		X		
			=	d by the encryption operation			
Must Use	C03201	994	Encryption Service		M ~ in a	ID 1/3	
				senting options for encryption processing filtering; the code either defines the enc			
			-	er specification for filtering binary data			
				t the following subelements define these			
			21	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)	,	
			22	Hexadecimal Filter	an a	ACCIT	
			22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (Filter	CBC)	, ASCII	
			41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), He	xadecimal	
				Filter	,,		
			42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), AS	CII Filter	
			ZZ	ZZ Mutually Defined			
				Use to specify filtered SKIPJACK.			
	C03202	1568	Algorithm ID		O	ID 3/3	
			Algorithm used for	Encryption			
			DE3	Triple DEA			
			DES	Data Encryption Standard (Same as D	EA)		
				As specified in FIPS 46-2.			
			SKJ	Skipjack			
	C03203	1569	Algorithm Mode o	_	O	ID 3/3	
				of the Encryption Algorithm			
			CBC	Cipher Block Chaining			
	C03204	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3	
				type of filter used to convert data code	value	es	
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter			
			ASC	ASCII Filter			
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			R64	Radix 64			
			UUE	UUencoding			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
	G0200#	=00	T7 1 T3 101	Use to indicate Base 64.		137.4/20	
	C03205	799	Version Identifier		X	AN 1/30	
	G02206	1.551	-	particular format, program, technique or	_		
	C03206	1571	Compression ID	11 1	X	ID 3/3	
			Type of Compression		. 22		
			913	X9E13 Compression as defined by X9	.52		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		,	
				Use to indicate that each block has be by using a combination of the Lempe algorithm and the Huffman coding,	l-Ziv	LZ77	

		Request for Comments (RFC) 1951 format.						
C03207 799		Version Identifier	X	AN 1/30				
		Revision level of a particular format, program, technic	que or algoi	rithm				
		Cite the version of the compression algorithm cited i	in S3S09 (C	CO3206) above				
S3S10	995	Length of Data	X	N 1/18				
		Length of data is the number of character positions of the compressed or encrypted/filtered text; when data is plain text, this field shall be absent						
S3S11	996	Initialization Vector	X	AN 16/512				
				•				

The archival representation of a value expressed in hexadecimal notation as ASCII characters from the set of characters (0..9, A..F); the value is used as a starting point for encryption of a data sequence to increase security by introducing cryptographic variance and to synchronize cryptographic equipment; a new Initialization Vector (IV) shall be used for each message; the IV shall not be intentionally reused; the binary value, not its ASCII representation, is used for the cryptographic process; in the interchange process, the resultant encrypted and filtered IV is sent; the hexadecimal notation is the representation for archiving purposes; the IV shall be a random or pseudo-random number

with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

If a transaction is encrypted at the group level, the ST and SE will be encrypted and not accessible.

Segment: S3A Assurance Header Level 1

Position: 040

Loop:

Level: Usage:

Optional

Max Use:

Purpose:

1 To allow for multiple assurances at the GSE level

Syntax Notes:

- 1 If any of C05005 C05006 C05007 or C05008 is present, then all are required.
- 2 If any of C05009 C05010 C05011 or C05012 is present, then all are required.
- 3 If C02804 is present, then C02803 is required.
- 4 If C02806 is present, then C02805 is required.
- 5 If C02808 is present, then C02807 is required.
- **6** If C02810 is present, then C02809 is required.
- 7 If C02812 is present, then C02811 is required.
- **8** If C02814 is present, then C02813 is required.
- 9 If C02816 is present, then C02815 is required.10 If C02818 is present, then C02817 is required.
- 11 If C02820 is present, then C02819 is required.

Semantic Notes:

Comments:

- 1 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S3A05 (assurance originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S3A06 (assurance recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- The date/time stamp may determine which of several key values apply, depending on start and expiration date of different key values that may share the same keyname.
- 4 Key distribution is performed by other means and thus only onetime keys are allowed in S3A11.

The use of particular codes and corresponding values in S3A11 is dependent on the exigencies of the various cryptographic algorithms.

Notes:

The S3A segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

			Data Lici	ient Summary				
	Ref.	Data						
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>		<u>Attributes</u>			
Must Use	S3A01	1621	Security Version/	Release Identifier Code	M ID 6/6			
			Code indicating the	e version/release of the ASC X12 standa	rd that is being used			
			for this specific sec	or this specific security structure. The version/release identified for this				
			segment also appli	es to any corresponding trailer or securit	y value segment.			
			This version/releas	e is independent of any other version/rel	lease identified in			
			another security se	gment at the transaction set or functional	l group level. This			
			•	ndependent of the version/release identif	0 1			
			interchange or fund	•				
			· ·	ata Element Dictionary for acceptable co	ode values.			
Must Use	S3A02	1432	Business Purpose	of Assurance	M ID 3/3			
1.1000 000	501102	1.02	-	s purpose for appending the assurance to				
				ctional group or transaction set); the coo	-			
			• '	siness or application that has control over	*			
			originator	siness of appreciation that has control over	T the assurance			
			ASG	Authorization Signature Appropriate	to this Document			
				• • • •				
			CSG	Authorization Co-signature Appropria	ate to this			
				Document				

Must Use	S3A03	C034	Computation Me	ethods	M			
			Algorithms used t	o calculate an assurance				
Must Use	C03401	1574	Assurance Algor	Assurance Algorithm				
			Code specifying t	he algorithm used to compute the assura	nce tok	ten		
			DSS	Digital Signature Standard				
				As specified in FIPS 186.				
			RSA	RSA				
Must Use	C03402	1575	Hashing Algorith	ım	M	ID 3/3		
			Code specifying t	he algorithm used to compute the assura	nce dig	gest		
			MD5	MD5				
			SHA	Secure hash algorithm				
				As specified in FIPS 180-1.				
Must Use	S3A04	1434	Domain of Comp	outation of Assurance	M	ID 1/2		
				he bounds of the text, whether contiguou				
				f the Assurance Token is computed usin	_			
			methodology of c	omputation and any relevant Assurance	Token	parameters		
			segment immedia	fined as a transaction set, beginning with tely following the ST segment terminato at not including the "S" in the first SVA segments	r and i	ncluding all		
			byte of the segme including all trans	The "body" can also be defined as a functional group, beginning with the fit byte of the segment immediately following the GS segment terminator and including all transaction sets up to but not including the "S" in the first SVA segment at the functional group level; DO NOT include any S3A segments				
				is defined as from the "S" in S3A or S4 nator of that segment	A up t	o and including		
				nce(s)" is defined as including the entire responding SVA segment that is associate evel Body Only Body Plus This Assurance Header O	ted with			
	S3A05	1435	Assurance Origin	•	, O	AN 1/64		
	55/105	1700	_	on (identity) of the cryptographic process	_			
				an data to be interchanged	, шас р	citornis uic		
			originator; no med	equired minimum length of 4 characters a chanism, or registration method, is provinces of the identifier				
	S3A06	1436	Assurance Recip		O	AN 1/64		

1436 **Assurance Recipient**

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs validation of the stated assurance on received data. In the absence of an Assurance Recipient all potential receivers will often be able to validate the assurance because the cryptographic technique is based on a "public" (as opposed to "secret") technology

Note: X9 has required minimum length of 4 characters for a security recipient; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

0

AN 1/35

Alphanumeric reference number issued by security assurance originator for the particular assurance in which it occurs; unique when used in combination with security originator data element S3A08 1437 **Date/Time Reference** AN 17/25 Date/time stamp in format as follows: YYYYMMDDHHNNSSTTTZZZ+XXXX, where YYYY = 4 digit year (with leading century), MM = month of year (01..12), DD = day of month (01..31), HH = hour of day in 24-hour format (00..23), NN = minutes of the hour (00-59), SS = second of hour (00..59), TTT = [optional] milli-seconds (000..999), ZZZ = [optional] three character, nominal timezone indicator (including daylight savings time indicator) and XXXXX = 3-5 digit (including leading + or - sign) offset of time to universal time, with three position format indicating hours-offset for whole hours, and five position format indicating hours and minutes offset where this is necessary. For example: 1993061522133OCDT+0930 which represents 15 June 1993, 22:13 (10:13pm), Central Daylight Time (Nominal Value "CDT"), in a timezone that is offset + 9:30 from Universal Time (Australia) S3A09 1438 **Assurance Text** 0 AN 1/64 Any text needed to convey the name of a signatory, registration number, certification number, or other assurance-originator defined or mutually-agreed business text related to the specific assurance; this text is not defined for X12 purposes and thus functions technically as "free form text" though it may have structure that is defined by the assurance originator, an industry group, a governmental agency, or bi-laterally between assurance originator and assurance recipient S3A10 C050 **Certificate Look-up Information** Conveys the information related to or used for certificate identification C05001 **Look-up Value Protocol Code** M ID 2/2 Must Use 1675 Code specifying the protocol used to identify a certificate 1. It is recommended that both the AA and AC codes be used since this ensures the unique identification of the certificate owner. 2. If either AB or AC is specified, AA must also be specified. AB or AC only may not be unique across domains. X509 Issuer Distinguished Name AAAB X509 Subject Distinguished Name AC X509 Certificate Serial Number 1570 **Must Use** C05002 Filter ID Code M ID 3/3 Code specifying the type of filter used to convert data code values **HDC** Hexadecimal Filter R64 Radix 64 ZZZ Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering. **Must Use** C05003 799 **Version Identifier** M AN 1/30 Revision level of a particular format, program, technique or algorithm **Must Use** C05004 1565 Look-up Value \mathbf{M} AN 1/4096 Value used to identify a certificate containing a public key **Must Use** C05005 1675 **Look-up Value Protocol Code** X ID 2/2

Assurance Reference Number

S3A07

1443

			esas specifying in	prototor asses to reciting a continuate		
				ded that both the AA and AC codes be ue identification of the certificate owner.	sed si	ince this
			2. If either AB or may not be unique	AC is specified, AA must also be specifi	ed. A	B or AC only
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name		
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name		
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number		
Must Use	C05006	1570	Filter ID Code	A307 Certificate Seriai Number	X	ID 3/3
Must Use	C03000	15/0		e type of filter used to convert data code		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter	varac	5
			R64	Radix 64		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
			LLL	•		
Manual III	C05005	700	Σ7 Τ.J	Used to specify no filtering.	v	A N. 1/20
Must Use	C05007	799	Version Identifier	particular format, program, technique or	X	AN 1/30
Must Use	C05008	1565	Look-up Value	particular format, program, teeminque of	X	AN 1/4096
Must Use	Cusuus	1303		tify a certificate containing a public key	А	AN 1/4090
	C05009	1675	Look-up Value P	•	X	ID 2/2
			-	e protocol used to identify a certificate		
				ded that both the AA and AC codes be u	sed si	ince this
				e identification of the certificate owner.		
			2. If either AB or may not be unique	AC is specified, AA must also be specified across domains.	ed. A	B or AC only
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name		
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name		
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number		
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3
			Code specifying th	e type of filter used to convert data code	value	S
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
			R64	Radix 64		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Used to specify no filtering.		
	C05011	799	Version Identifier		X	AN 1/30
			Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algor	rithm
	C05012	1565	Look-up Value		X	AN 1/4096
			Value used to iden	tify a certificate containing a public key		
	S3A11	C028	Assurance Token	Parameters	O	
			Parameters needed	to calculate the Assurance Token		
Must Use	C02801	1439	Assurance Token	Parameter Code	M	ID 2/2
			A code specifying	the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
			CI	Certification Authority ID		
			EK	Key Value - One-Time Key		
			KN	Key Name		
			NT	Notarization		
			OD	Key-Encrypting-Key for One-Time Ke	÷у	

Code specifying the protocol used to identify a certificate

			UI User ID		
Must Use	C02802	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance y be required
	C02803	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code	X	ID 2/2
	G00004	1110	A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	_	1374164
	C02804	1442	A value of a peremeter value	0	AN 1/64
	C02805	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
	C02806	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
	C02807	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
	C02808	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
	C02809	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
	C02810	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
	C02811	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
	C02012	1442	A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	0	A NI 1/64
	C02812	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	0	AN 1/64
	C02813	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
	C02814	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
	C02815	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
	C02816	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
	C02817	1439	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti- proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value Assurance Token Parameter Code	npute	the Assurance
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
	C02818	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64

		A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assurance					
		1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0	Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required				
C02819	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code	\mathbf{X}	ID 2/2			
		A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter					
C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64			
			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for the proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assurance				

Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required

Segment: S2S Security Header Level 2

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for

authentication or encryption of a transaction set

Syntax Notes: 1 If either S2S04 or S2S05 is present, then the other is required.

2 If any of S2S06 S2S07 S2S08 or S2S09 is present, then all are required.

Semantic Notes: 1 If S2S01 is ``AA" or ``BB", S2S04 is required. If S2S01 is ``BB" or ``EE", S2S06 is required.

Comments:

Notes:

1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the

uniqueness of the identifier

2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier.

3. The S2S segment represented here is only valid for versions 003040 and 003050.

	Ref.	Data	2 2.0				
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>	Att	<u>ributes</u>		
Must Use	S2S01	990	Security Type		ID 2/2		
			Code identifying the security algorithms and methods employed for this level				
			interchange.				
			EE Encryption, No Authentication				
Must Use	S2S02	824	Security Originator Name	M	AN 4/16		
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or cryptographic service message				
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the sec mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X1 uniqueness of the identifier	-	-		
Must Use	S2S03	825	Security Recipient Name	\mathbf{M}	AN 4/16		
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process				
			authentication or decryption on received data, or is the dest	inatio	n of a		
			cryptographic service message				
			Note: X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for the sec mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X1 uniqueness of the identifier				
Not Used	S2S04	991	Authentication Key Name	\mathbf{X}	AN 1/16		
			Name of the key used for authentication. This name is mutu security originator and the security recipient, is unique for tallows a particular key to be specified.	-			
Not Used	S2S05	992	Authentication Service Code	X	ID 1/1		
110t Oscu	52505)) <u>2</u>	Authentication option	21	10 1/1		
Must Use	S2S06	993	Encryption Key Name	X	AN 1/16		
Must Use	52500	993	Name of the key used for encryption. This name is mutually				
			security originator and the security recipient, is unique for t				
			allows a particular key to be specified.	1113 10	autonsinp, and		
			If FORTEZZA is to be used, SKIPJACK is specified here.				
Must Use	S2S07	994	Encryption Service Code	X	ID 1/3		

Coded values representing options for encryption processing. The code defines the encryption mode and the transmission filter specification for filtering binary ciphertext data into transmittable text.

	Use to specify hexadecimal filtered SKIPJACK.
ZZ	Mutually Defined
42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), ASCII Filter
	Filter
41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback), Hexadecimal
	Filter
22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), ASCII
	Hexadecimal Filter
21	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC),

Must Use S2S08 995 Length of Data (LOD)

X N 1/18

Length of data is the number of character positions of the encrypted, filtered text.

If SKIPJACK is specified in the S2S07, the length of data includes the length of the Initialization Vector (S2S09).

Must Use S2S09 996

Initialization Vector (IV)

X AN 16/16

The archival representation of a 64-bit value expressed in hexadecimal notation as 16 ASCII characters from the set of characters (0..9, A..F); the 64-bit value is used as a starting point for encryption of a data sequence to increase security by introducing cryptographic variance and to synchronize cryptographic equipment; a new Initialization Vector (IV) shall be used for each message; the IV shall not be intentionally reused; the 64-bit binary value, not its ASCII representation, is used for the cryptographic process; in the interchange process, the resultant encrypted and filtered 64-bit IV is sent; the hexadecimal notation is the representation for archiving purposes; the IV shall be a random or pseudo-random number; when encrypted, the IV must be decrypted using the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode and the same key used to encrypt the message

Although the current 16 byte Initialization Vector (S2S09) was designed to support DES (ANSI X9.23) encryption, the SKIPJACK algorithm can be used. SKIPJACK requires a 24 byte S2S09 field. If SKIPJACK is specified in the S2S07, sixteen ASCII 'F' characters are entered in the S2S09 field. This sets all the bits high in this field. A segment terminator follows the S2S09 field. Immediately following the segment terminator will be a 24 byte S2S09 field and the SKIPJACK encrypted data. There is no data element separator between the S2S09 and the encrypted data. An S2E (security trailer), the ASCII character 'Z' and the segment terminator follow the SKIPJACK encrypted data.

Segment: S2S Security Header Level 2

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for

authentication or encryption of a transaction set

Syntax Notes: 1 If either S2S04 or S2S05 is present, then the other is required.

If any of S2S06 S2S07 S2S08 or S2S09 is present, then all are required.

- 3 If either C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required.
- 4 If either C03206 or C03207 is present, then the other is required.

Semantic Notes: 1 If S2S01 is "AA", "BB", "AC" or "BC", then S2S04 is required. If S2S01 is "BB", "EE", "AC" or "EC", then S2S06 is required.

Comments:

- 1 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2S02 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2S03 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- In S2S04 the special name "01234567890ABCDEF" is reserved for the hexadecimal value 01234567890ABCDEF (i.e., a fixed nonsecret value) to provide a well-known value for data-integrity testing only.

Notes:

- 1. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S02 (the security originator); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier
- 2. X9 has a minimum length of 4 characters for S2S03 (the security recipient); no mechanism, or registration method is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee the uniqueness of the identifier.
- 3. The S2S segment represented here is only valid for versions 003060 and 003070.

	Ref.	Data		<u>,</u>				
3.5 . 77	Des.	Element	Name			ributes		
Must Use	S2S01	990	Security Type		M	ID 2/2		
			• •	e security algorithms and methods applied	ed for	this level of		
			interchange					
			EC	No Authentication, Compression, Enc	ryptio	n		
			EE	No Authentication, No Compression,	Encry	ption		
Must Use	S2S02	824	Security Originato	or Name	\mathbf{M}	AN 1/64		
			Unique designation	(identity) of the cryptographic process to	hat pe	erforms		
			authentication or er	acryption on data to be interchanged, or	origin	ates a		
			cryptographic servi	ce message				
			Note: X9 has a mir	nimum length of 4 characters for the seco	arity c	originator; no		
			mechanism, or regi	stration method is provided by X9 or X1	2 to g	guarantee the		
			uniqueness of the ic	lentifier				
	S2S03	825	Security Recipient	Name	O	AN 1/64		
			Unique designation	(identity) of the cryptographic process t	that pe	erforms		
				authentication or decryption on received data, or is the destination of a				
				cryptographic service message				
			71 0 1					
			Note: X9 has a mir	nimum length of 4 characters for the seco	arity r	recipient; no		
				stration method is provided by X9 or X1	-	-		
			uniqueness of the ic	<u>*</u>	Ū			
Not Used	S2S04	991	Authentication Ke		X	AN 1/64		
				-				

			Name of the key used for authentication; this name is mutually known security originator and the security recipient, is unique for this relation is intended to allow the changing of the key from time to time				
			hexidecimal value (xey name "0123456789ABCDEF" is rese 0123456789ABCDEF (i.e. a fixed non-se vn value for data integrity testing only)			
Not Used	S2S05	992	Authentication Ser Authentication option	rvice Code	X	ID 1/1	
Must Use	S2S06	C031	Encryption Key In	formation	X		
			Information needed	to identify or obtain the encryption key			
Must Use	C03101	993	security originator a	ame ed for encryption; this name is mutually land the security recipient, is unique for the changing of the key from time to time.	is rel		
			Note: If any of the	optional fields are present, the Key Nam	e sho	uld contain	
				a public key is being used to encrypt the		•	
			the actual name of t	to en	crypt the one-		
			time key. If FORTEZZA is to	be used, SKIPJACK is specified here.			
	C03102	1564	Protocol ID	, ,	0	ID 3/3	
			Code specifying pro	otocol used to encrypt the session key			
			KEA	Key Encryption Algorithm			
			RSA	RSA Algorithm			
	C03103	1565	Look-up Value		0	AN 1/512	
			one-time key	ify a certificate containing the public key	used		
	C03104	1566	Keying Material		O	AN 1/512	
				required for decrypting the one-time key ers, the Randomized value (Ra) is place timal format."		his data	
	C03105	1567	One-time Encrypti	*	0	AN 1/512	
			Hexadecimally filte	red encrypted one-time key			
Must Use	S2S07	C032	Encryption Service		X		
			Information require	d by the encryption operation			
Must Use	C03201	994	of compression and the transmission filt	se Code senting options for encryption processing filtering; the code either defines the encr er specification for filtering binary data it the following subelements define these ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (C Hexadecimal Filter	ryptic nto ti value	on mode and cansmittable	
			22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (C	CBC)	, ASCII	
			41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback Filter), He	xadecimal	
			42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback	, AS	CII Filter	
			ZZ	Mutually Defined			
				Use to specify hexadecimal filtered SI	XIP J.	ACK.	
	C03202	1568	Algorithm ID		O	ID 3/3	

			Algorithm used for	Encryption		
			DE3	Triple DEA		
			DES	Data Encryption Standard (Same as DEA)	
				As specified in FIPS 46-2.	,	
			SKJ	Skipjack		
	C03203	1569	Algorithm Mode o	10	ID 3/3	
			_	of the Encryption Algorithm		
			CBC	Cipher Block Chaining		
	C03204	1570	Filter ID Code	X	ID 3/3	
				e type of filter used to convert data code val		
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
			ASC	ASCII Filter		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
			UUE	Uuencoding		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
			222	Use to indicate Base 64.		
	C03205	799	Version Identifier	X	AN 1/30	
	000200			particular format, program, technique or als		
	C03206	1571	Compression ID	X		
	000200	10,1	Type of Compression		. 12 0/0	
			913	X9E13 Compression as defined by X9.32)	
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined	,	
				Use to indicate that each block has been	compressed	
				by using a combination of the Lempel-Z	_	
				algorithm and Huffman coding, in acco		
				the Internet Engineering Task Force (II	ETF) Request	
	C03207	799	Version Identifier	for Comments (RFC) 1951 format.	AN 1/30	
	C03207	177		particular format, program, technique or als		
				the compression algorithm cited in S2S07		
			above.	the compression algorithm chea in 52507	(C03200)	
Must Use	S2S08	995	Length of Data	Х	N 1/18	
			<u>e</u>	e number of character positions of the comp		
			* *	ext; when data is plain text, this field shall b		.1
			of the Initialization	ecified in the S2S07, the length of data ind	ludes the lengt	in
Must Use	S2S09	996	Initialization Vect	·	AN 16/16	
	2-2-7-			entation of a 64-bit value expressed in hexa		on
				eters from the set of characters (09, AF);		
				point for encryption of a data sequence to		У
				otographic variance and to synchronize cryp nitialization Vector (IV) shall be used for ea		
				ntionally reused; the 64-bit binary value, no		ıc
				sed for the cryptographic process; in the int		
			process, the resultar	nt encrypted and filtered 64-bit IV is sent; t	ne hexadecimal	Ĺ
				esentation for archiving purposes; the IV sh		
				number; when encrypted, the IV must be de		ne
			message	ook (ECB) mode and the same key used to e	nerypt me	
				ent 16 byte Initialization Vector (S2S09) w	as designed to	
				•		

support DES (ANSI X9.23) encryption, the SKIPJACK algorithm can be used. SKIPJACK requires a 24 byte S2S09 field. If SKIPJACK is specified in the S2S07, sixteen ASCII 'F' characters are entered in the S2S09 field. This sets all the bits high in this field. A segment terminator follows the S2S09 field. Immediately following the segment terminator will be a 24 byte S2S09 field and the SKIPJACK encrypted data. There is no data element separator between the S2S09 and the encrypted data. An S2E (security trailer), the ASCII character 'Z' and the segment terminator follow the SKIPJACK encrypted data.

Segment: S4S Security Header Level 2

Position: 060

Loop:

Level: Usage:

Semantic Notes:

Comments:

Optional

Max Use:

Purpose: To initiate the beginning of a secured area and to provide the parameters needed for

authentication or encryption of a transaction set

Syntax Notes: 1 If either S4S05 or S4S06 is present, then the other is required.

2 If any of S4S08 S4S09 S4S10 or S4S11 is present, then all are required.

3 If any of C05005 C05006 C05007 or C05008 is present, then all are required.

4 If any of C05009 C05010 C05011 or C05012 is present, then all are required.

5 If either C03204 or C03205 is present, then the other is required.

6 If either C03206 or C03207 is present, then the other is required.

1 If S4S02 is "AA", "BB", "AC", or "BC", then S4S05 is required.

If S4S02 is "BB", "EE", "AC", or "EC", then S4S08 is required.

If S4S02 is "CC" then S4S09 is required.

1 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S4S03 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee

uniqueness of the identifier.

2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S4S04 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee

uniqueness of the identifier.

3 In S4S05, the special name "01234567890ABCDEF" is reserved for the hexadecimal value 01234567890ABCDEF (i.e., a fixed, non-secret value) to provide a well-

known value for data-integrity testing only.

Notes: The S4S segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

			Data Elen	nent Summary	
	Ref.	Data			
	Des.	Element	<u>Name</u>		<u>Attributes</u>
Must Use	S4S01	1621	Security Version/	Release Identifier Code	M ID 6/6
			Code indicating the	e version/release of the ASC X12 standar	rd that is being used
			for this specific sec	curity structure. The version/release iden	tified for this
			segment also appli	es to any corresponding trailer or security	y value segment.
			This version/releas	se is independent of any other version/rel	ease identified in
			another security se	gment at the transaction set or functional	group level. This
			version/release is i	ndependent of the version/release identif	ied at the
			interchange or fund	ctional group level	
			004010	Draft Standards Approved for Publica	•
				Procedures Review Board through Oc	tober 1997
Must Use	S4S02	990	Security Type Co		M ID 2/2
			Code identifying the interchange	ne security algorithms and methods appli	ed for this level of
			EC	No Authentication, Compression, Enc	ryption
			EE	No Authentication, No Compression,	Encryption
Must Use	S4S03	824	Security Originator Name M AN 1/64 Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or encryption on data to be interchanged, or originates a		
				ice message nimum length of 4 characters for the secularition method is provided by X9 or X1	

	S4S04	825	uniqueness of t Security Recip	ient Name	0	AN 1/64	
			Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs authentication or decryption on received data, or is the destination of a cryptographic service message				
			mechanism, or uniqueness of t				
Not Used	S4S05	991	Authentication Key Name X AN 1/64 Name of the key used for authentication; this name is mutually known to the security originator and the security recipient, is unique for this relationship, and is intended to allow the changing of the key from time to time			nown to the	
			hexadecimal va	cial key name "0123456789ABCDEF" is really 0123456789ABCDEF (i.e. a fixed non	-secret		
Not Used	S4S06	992		known value for data integrity testing only) 1 Service Code options) X	ID 1/1	
	S4S07	C050	Certificate Lo	ok-up Information	O		
			Conveys the in	formation related to or used for certificate i	dentific	cation	
Must Use	C05001	1675		e Protocol Code	M	ID 2/2	
				g the protocol used to identify a certificate	-		
			1. It is recommended that both the AA and AC codes be used since this ensures the unique identification of the certificate owner.				
			2. If either AB or AC is specified, AA must also be specified. AB or AC only may not be unique across domains.				
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name			
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name			
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number			
			ZZ	Mutually Defined			
Must Use	C05002	1570	Filter ID Code		M	ID 3/3	
				g the type of filter used to convert data cod	e value	es	
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			R64	Radix 64			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
Must Has	C05003	700	Vancion Identi	Used to specify no filtering.	М	A NI 1/20	
Must Use	C05003	799	Version Identi Revision level	ner of a particular format, program, technique (M or algoi	AN 1/30 rithm	
Must Use	C05004	1565	Look-up Valu		M	AN 1/4096	
Must Use	C05005	1675		e Protocol Code	X	ID 2/2	
			Code specifying the protocol used to identify a certificate				
			1. It is recommended that both the AA and AC codes be used since this				
			ensures the unique identification of the certificate owner.				
			2. If either AB or AC is specified, AA must also be specified. AB or AC only				
			may not be unique across domains. AA X509 Issuer Distinguished Name				
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name			

			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number			
Must Use	C05006	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3	
				the type of filter used to convert data cod	e value		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			R64	Radix 64			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
				Used to specify no filtering.			
Must Use	C05007	799	Version Identific		X	AN 1/30	
			Revision level of	a particular format, program, technique o	or algo	rithm	
Must Use	C05008	1565	Look-up Value Value used to ide	entify a certificate containing a public key	X	AN 1/4096	
	C05009	1675	Look-up Value l		X	ID 2/2	
	202002	20.0	-	the protocol used to identify a certificate		12 2,2	
				nded that both the AA and AC codes be	used s	ince this	
			ensures the unique identification of the certificate owner.				
			2. If either AB or AC is specified, AA must also be specified. AB or AC only may not be unique across domains.				
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name			
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name			
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number			
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3	
			Code specifying the type of filter used to convert data code values				
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			R64	Radix 64			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
				Used to specify no filtering.			
	C05011	799	Version Identific	er	X	AN 1/30	
			Revision level of	a particular format, program, technique of	or algo	rithm	
	C05012	1565	Look-up Value		X	AN 1/4096	
			Value used to ide	ntify a certificate containing a public key			
Must Use	S4S08	C031	Encryption Key	Information	X		
			To provide inform	nation needed to identify or obtain the en	cryptic	on key	
Must Use	C03101	993	Encryption Key		M	AN 1/64	
				used for encryption; this name is mutually			
			security originator and the security recipient, is unique for this relationship, and is intended to allow the changing of the key from time to time				
				ne optional fields are present, the Key Na			
				if a public key is being used to encrypt the first the asymmetric key-encrypting-key use			
			time key.	if the asymmetre key enerypting key use	a to ch	erypt the one	
				s to be used, SKIPJACK is specified here	e .		
			Ductocal ID		_		
	C03102	1564	Protocol ID		O	ID 3/3	
	C03102	1564		protocol used to encrypt the session key	O	ID 3/3	
	C03102	1564		protocol used to encrypt the session key Key Encryption Algorithm	0	ID 3/3	
	C03102	1564	Code specifying 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	O	ID 3/3	

			Additional material required for decrypting the one-time key				
			For SKIPJACK users, the Randomized value (Ra) is placed in this data				
			element in hexadecimal format.				
	C03104	1567	One-time Encrypt	ion Key	O	AN 1/512	
			Hexadecimally filte	ered encrypted one-time key			
Must Use	S4S09	C032	Encryption Service	e Information	X		
			Information require	d by the encryption operation			
Must Use	C03201	994	Encryption Service		M	ID 1/3	
			Coded values representing options for encryption processi				
			of compression and filtering; the code either defines the er the transmission filter specification for filtering binary dat				
			text or specifics that the following subelements define the				
			21	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)	,	
			22	Hexadecimal Filter	CDC)	A CCII	
			22	ANSI X9.23 Cipher Block Chaining (Filter	CBC)	, ASCII	
			41	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback	;), He	xadecimal	
				Filter			
			42	ANSI X9.23 CFB-8 (Cipher Feedback	t), AS	CII Filter	
			ZZ	Mutually Defined			
	~~~~	4 = 40		Used to specify filtered SKIPJACK.			
	C03202	1568	Algorithm ID		O	ID 3/3	
			Algorithm used for				
			DE3	Triple DEA	E A \		
			DES	Data Encryption Standard (Same as D	EA)		
			SKJ	As specified in FIPS 46-2. Skipjack			
	C03203	1569	Algorithm Mode o	==	o	ID 3/3	
	C03203	1307	•	of the Encryption Algorithm	J	ID 3/3	
			CBC	Cipher Block Chaining			
	C03204	1570	Filter ID Code	Cipier Brock Chamming	X	ID 3/3	
				e type of filter used to convert data code			
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter			
			ASC	ASCII Filter			
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter			
			UUE	UUencoding			
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined			
			Use to indicate Base 64.				
	C03205	<b>799</b>	Version Identifier		X	AN 1/30	
			Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algo	rithm	
	C03206	1571	Compression ID		X	ID 3/3	
			Type of Compression Used				
			Use to indicate that each block has been compressed by using a combination of the Lempel-Ziv LZ77 algorithm and the Huffman coding, in accordance with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 1951 format.				
				ta Element Dictionary for acceptable co	de va	lues.	
	C03207	799	Version Identifier		X	AN 1/30	

Revision level of a particular format, program, technique or algorithm

Cite the version of the compression algorithm cited in S4S (C03206) above.

S4S10 995 Length of Data

X N 1/18

Length of data is the number of character positions of the compressed or encrypted/filtered text; when data is plain text, this field shall be absent

S4S11 996 Initialization Vector

X AN 16/512

The archival representation of a value expressed in hexadecimal notation as ASCII characters from the set of characters (0..9, A..F); the value is used as a starting point for encryption of a data sequence to increase security by introducing cryptographic variance and to synchronize cryptographic equipment; a new Initialization Vector (IV) shall be used for each message; the IV shall not be intentionally reused; the binary value, not its ASCII representation, is used for the cryptographic process; in the interchange process, the resultant encrypted and filtered IV is sent; the hexadecimal notation is the representation for archiving purposes; the IV shall be a random or pseudo-random number

S2A Assurance Level 2 **Segment:** Optional Usage: Max Use: 1 **Purpose:** To allow for multiple assurances at the ST/SE level **Syntax Notes:** If C02804 is present, then C02803 is required. 2 If C02806 is present, then C02805 is required. 3 If C02808 is present, then C02807 is required. 4 If C02810 is present, then C02809 is required. 5 If C02812 is present, then C02811 is required. 6 If C02814 is present, then C02813 is required. 7 If C02816 is present, then C02815 is required. 8 If C02818 is present, then C02817 is required. If C02820 is present, then C02819 is required. **Semantic Notes: Comments:** X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2A04 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S2A05 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. The date/time stamp may determine which of several key values apply, depending on start and expiration dates of different key values that may share the same keyname. Key distribution is performed by other means and thus only onetime keys are allowed in S2A09. The use of particular codes and corresponding values in S2A09 is dependent on the exigencies of the various crytographic algorithms. **Notes:** 1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S2A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S2A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the SE segment of the transaction set for which assurance is being provided. See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines. 2. The S2A segment represented here is only valid for versions 003060 and 003070. **Data Element Summary** Ref. Data Des. **Element Name Attributes** Must Use S2A01 1432 **Business Purpose of Assurance** ID 3/3 The stated business purpose for appending the assurance to an existing securedentity (whether functional group or transaction set); the codes represent the intention of the business or application that has control over the assurance originator **ASG** Authorization Signature Appropriate to this Document **CSG** Authorization Co-signature Appropriate to this Document Must Use S2A02 C034 **Computation Methods**  $\mathbf{M}$ Algorithms used to calculate an assurance Must Use C03401 1574 **Assurance Algorithm** M ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance token DSS Digital Signature Standard As specified in FIPS 186. **RSA RSA** Must Use C03402 1575 **Hashing Algorithm** M ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance digest MD5 MD5

SHA Secure hash algorithm

#### As specified in FIPS 180-1.

# Must Use S2A03 1434 Domain of Computation of Assurance Digest M ID 1/2

The bounds of the text, whether contiguous or not, over which the computation of the Assurance Token is computed using the defined methodology of computation and any relevant Assurance Token parameters; the "body" is either a transaction set (beginning with the ST and including all segments up to the first S2A segment, but excluding any S2S segment) or functional group (beginning with the GS and including all transaction sets up to the first S1A segment, but excluding any S1S segment

"This Assurance" is defined as from the "S" in S1A or S2A up to and including the data element separator preceding the assurance digest

"Previous Assurance(s)" is defined as including the entire S1A or S2A segment and the entire SVA that follows the included S1A or S2A  $\,$ 

A Body Only

B Body plus This Assurance Only

# S2A04 1435 Assurance Originator

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs the stated assurance on data to be interchanged

Note: X9 has a required minimum length of 4 characters for a security originator; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

### S2A05 1436 Assurance Recipient

O AN 1/64

AN 1/64

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs validation of the stated assurance on received data. In the absence of an Assurance Recipient all potential receivers will often be able to validate the assurance because the cryptographic technique is based on a "public" (as opposed to "secret") technology

Note: X9 has required minimum length of 4 characters for a security recipient; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

# S2A06 1443 Assurance Reference Number

O AN 1/35

Alphanumeric reference number issued by security assurance originator for the particular assurance in which it occurs; unique when used in combination with security originator data element

# S2A07 1437 Date/Time Reference

O AN 17/25

Date/time stamp in format as follows:

YYYYMMDDHHNNSSTTTZZZ+XXXX, where YYYY = 4 digit year (with leading century), MM = month of year (01..12), DD = day of month (01..31), HH = hour of day in 24-hour format (00..23), NN = minutes of the hour (00-59), SS = second of hour (00..59), TTT = [optional] milli-seconds (000..999), ZZZ = [optional] three character, nominal time zone indicator (including daylight savings time indicator) and XXXXX = 3-5 digit (including leading + or - sign) offset of time to universal time, with three position format indicating hours-offset for whole hours, and five position format indicating hours and minutes offset where this is necessary. For example:

			199306152213300CDT+0930 which represents 15 June 1993, 22:13 (10:13pm), Central Daylight Time (Nominal Value "CDT"), in a time zone t is offset + 9:30 from Universal Time (Australia)			
	S2A08	1438	Assurance Text	ii Oiii (orașii Time (Tastiana)	O	AN 1/64
			certification numbe business text related purposes and thus fi structure that is defi governmental agend assurance recipient		or mut t defi hough stry g	nually-agreed ned for X12 n it may have roup, a
	S2A09	C028	Assurance Token		O	
				to calculate the Assurance Token		
Must Use	C02801	1439	Assurance Token		M	ID 2/2
				he type of Assurance Token Parameter		
			CI	Certification Authority ID		
			EK	Key Value - One-Time Key		
			KN	Key Name		
			NT	Notarization		
			OD	Key-Encrypting-Key for One-Time Ke	y	
			UI	User ID		
Must Use Not Used	C02802 C02803	1442 1439	proper operation of Token; depending of <b>Assurance Token</b>	eter, usually specifying one or more opti- the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	pute	the Assurance
Not Used	C02804	1442	Assurance Token	• •	O	AN 1/64
			A value of a parame proper operation of Token; depending of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti- the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	pute	the Assurance be required
Not Used	C02805	1439	Assurance Token land A code specifying to	Parameter Code he type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02806	1442	Assurance Token		O	AN 1/64
				eter, usually specifying one or more optic		
				the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	_	
Not Used	C02807	1439	Assurance Token	<u> </u>	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02808	1442	Assurance Token		O	AN 1/64
			A value of a parame proper operation of Token; depending of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti- the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	ons, ro npute s may	equired for the the Assurance be required
Not Used	C02809	1439	A code specifying t	Parameter Code he type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02810	1442	Assurance Token		0	AN 1/64
Not Used	C02811	1439	A value of a parame proper operation of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti- the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	ons, ro	equired for the the Assurance
			A code specifying t	he type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02812	1442	Assurance Token	Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64

			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com	pute	the Assurance
			Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values		
Not Used	C02813	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code	X	ID 2/2
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02814	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic		
			proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com		
Not Used	C02815	1439	Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values  Assurance Token Parameter Code	s may <b>X</b>	<b>ID 2/2</b>
Not Oseu	C02013	1437	A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	Λ	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02816	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	0	AN 1/64
Not Oseu	C02010	1772	A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic	_	
			proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com		•
			Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values	-	
Not Used	C02817	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code	$\mathbf{X}$	ID 2/2
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02818	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	$\mathbf{o}$	AN 1/64
			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic	ns, r	equired for the
			proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com	pute	
	G0.4010	4.00	Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values		•
Not Used	C02819	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code	s may	be required ID 2/2
			Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used Not Used	C02819 C02820	1439 1442	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter Assurance Token Parameter Value	х О	ID 2/2 AN 1/64
			Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic	X O ons, re	ID 2/2  AN 1/64 equired for the
			Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com	X O ons, repute	AN 1/64 equired for the the Assurance
	C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values	Ons, respute s may	AN 1/64 equired for the the Assurance by be required
			Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values Assurance Digest	O ons, respute s may	AN 1/64 required for the the Assurance be required AN 1/512
	C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter Assurance Token Parameter Value A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more optic proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to com Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values	O ons, respute s may	AN 1/64 required for the the Assurance be required AN 1/512

Segment: S4A Assurance Header Level 2

**Position:** 070

Loop:

Level:

Usage: Optional

Max Use:

**Purpose:** To allow for multiple assurances at the ST/SE level

# **Syntax Notes:**

- 1 If any of C05005 C05006 C05007 or C05008 is present, then all are required.
- 2 If any of C05009 C05010 C05011 or C05012 is present, then all are required.
- 3 If C02804 is present, then C02803 is required.
- 4 If C02806 is present, then C02805 is required.
- 5 If C02808 is present, then C02807 is required.
- 6 If C02810 is present, then C02809 is required.
- 7 If C02812 is present, then C02811 is required.
- **8** If C02814 is present, then C02813 is required.
- **9** If C02816 is present, then C02815 is required.
- 10 If C02818 is present, then C02817 is required.
- 11 If C02820 is present, then C02819 is required.

### Semantic Notes: Comments:

- 1 X9 has required minimum length of four characters for S4A05 (assurance originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier.
- 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S4A06 (assurance recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of identifier.
- The date/time stamp may determine which of several key values apply, depending on start and expiration dates of different key values that may share the same keyname.
- 4 Key distribution is performed by other means and thus only onetime keys are allowed in S4A11.

The use of particular codes and corresponding values in S4A11 is dependent on the exigencies of the various cryptographic algorithms.

### **Notes:**

# The S4A segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

	Ref.	Data				
	Des.	<b>Element</b>	Name		<u>Attributes</u>	
Must Use	S4A01	1621	Security Version/I	Release Identifier Code	M ID 6/6	
			Code indicating the	version/release of the ASC X12 st	andard that is being used	
			for this specific sec	urity structure. The version/release	identified for this	
			segment also applie	s to any corresponding trailer or se	curity value segment.	
			This version/release	e is independent of any other version	n/release identified in	
			another security seg	gment at the transaction set or funct	ional group level. This	
			version/release is in	dependent of the version/release ic	lentified at the	
			interchange or func	tional group level		
			004010	Draft Standards Approved for Pu	blication by ASC X12	
				Procedures Review Board through	h October 1997	
<b>Must Use</b>	S4A02	1432	<b>Business Purpose</b>	of Assurance	M ID 3/3	
			The stated business purpose for appending the assurance to an existing securentity (whether functional group or transaction set); the codes represent the intention of the business or application that has control over the assurance			
			originator	mess of application that has contro	over the assurance	
			ASG	Authorization Signature Appropr	iate to this Document	

ID 1/2

**CSG** Authorization Co-signature Appropriate to this Document Must Use S4A03 C034 **Computation Methods** M Algorithms used to calculate an assurance M Must Use C03401 1574 **Assurance Algorithm** ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance token DSS Digital Signature Standard As specified in FIPS 186. **RSA** RSA **Must Use** C03402 1575 **Hashing Algorithm** M ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance digest MD5 SHA Secure hash algorithm As specified in FIPS 180-1.

Domain of Computation of Assurance M

Code specifying the bounds of the text, whether contiguous or not, over which the computation of the Assurance Token is computed using the defined methodology of computation and any relevant Assurance Token parameters

The "body" is defined as a transaction set, beginning with the first byte of the segment immediately following the ST segment terminator and including all segments up to but not including the "S" in the first SVA segment; DO NOT include any S4A segments

The "body" can also be defined as a functional group, beginning with the first byte of the segment immediately following the GS segment terminator and including all transaction sets up to but not including the "S" in the first SVA segment at the functional group level; DO NOT include any S3A segments

"This Assurance" is defined as from the "S" in S3A or S4A up to and including the segment terminator of that segment

"Previous Assurance(s)" is defined as including the entire S3A or S4A segment and the entire corresponding SVA segment that is associated with the S3A or S4A at the same level

A Body Only

B Body Plus This Assurance Header Only

S4A05 1435 Assurance Originator O AN 1/64

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs the stated assurance on data to be interchanged

Note: X9 has a required minimum length of 4 characters for a security originator; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

S4A06 1436 Assurance Recipient O AN 1/64

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs validation of the stated assurance on received data. In the absence of an Assurance Recipient all potential receivers will often be able to validate the assurance because the cryptographic technique is based on a "public" (as opposed to "secret") technology

Note: X9 has required minimum length of 4 characters for a security recipient;

Must Use

S4A04

1434

no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

#### S4A07 1443 Assurance Reference Number

O AN 1/35

Alphanumeric reference number issued by security assurance originator for the particular assurance in which it occurs; unique when used in combination with security originator data element

#### S4A08 1437 Date/Time Reference

O AN 17/25

Date/time stamp in format as follows:

YYYYMMDDHHNNSSTTTZZZ+XXXX, where YYYY = 4 digit year (with leading century), MM = month of year (01..12), DD = day of month (01..31), HH = hour of day in 24-hour format (00..23), NN = minutes of the hour (00-59), SS = second of hour (00..59), TTT = [optional] milli-seconds (000..999), ZZZ = [optional] three character, nominal timezone indicator (including daylight savings time indicator) and XXXXX = 3-5 digit (including leading + or - sign) offset of time to universal time, with three position format indicating hours-offset for whole hours, and five position format indicating hours and minutes offset where this is necessary. For example:

1993061522133OCDT+0930 which represents 15 June 1993, 22:13 (10:13pm), Central Daylight Time (Nominal Value "CDT"), in a timezone that is offset + 9:30 from Universal Time (Australia)

#### S4A09 1438 Assurance Text

O AN 1/64

Any text needed to convey the name of a signatory, registration number, certification number, or other assurance-originator defined or mutually-agreed business text related to the specific assurance; this text is not defined for X12 purposes and thus functions technically as "free form text" though it may have structure that is defined by the assurance originator, an industry group, a governmental agency, or bi-laterally between assurance originator and assurance recipient

#### S4A10 C050

### **Certificate Look-up Information**

O

Conveys the information related to or used for certificate identification

Must Use C05001 1675

# **Look-up Value Protocol Code**

M ID 2/2

Code specifying the protocol used to identify a certificate

- 1. It is recommended that both the AA and AC codes be used since this ensures the unique identification of the certificate owner.
- 2. If either AB or AC is specified, AA must also be specified. AB or AC only may not be unique across domains.

AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name
AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name
AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number

Must Use C05002 1570

Filter ID Code

M ID 3/3

Code specifying the type of filter used to convert data code values

HDC Hexadecimal Filter

R64 Radix 64

ZZZ Mutually Defined

Used to specify no filtering.

Must Use C05003 799 Version Identifier

M AN 1/30

			Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algo	rithm
Must Use	C05004	1565	Look-up Value		M	AN 1/4096
			Value used to identi	ify a certificate containing a public key		
Must Use	C05005	1675	Look-up Value Pro		X	ID 2/2
				e protocol used to identify a certificate		
				led that both the AA and AC codes be u	sed s	nce this
			ensures ine unique	identification of the certificate owner.		
			2. If either AB or A	AC is specified, AA must also be specifi	ed. A	B or AC only
			may not be unique			
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name		
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name		
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number		
Must Use	C05006	1570	Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3
			HDC	e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter	varue	S
			R64	Radix 64		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Used to specify no filtering.		
Must Use	C05007	799	Version Identifier	Osea to specify no fluering.	X	AN 1/30
Must Osc	C03007	177		particular format, program, technique or		
Must Use	C05008	1565	Look-up Value	71 5 / 1	X	AN 1/4096
			_	ify a certificate containing a public key		
	C05009	1675	Look-up Value Pro	otocol Code	$\mathbf{X}$	ID 2/2
			Code specifying the	e protocol used to identify a certificate		
				led that both the $AA$ and $AC$ codes be $oldsymbol{u}$	sed s	ince this
			ensures the unique	identification of the certificate owner.		
			2. If either AB or A	AC is specified, AA must also be specifi	ed. A	B or AC only
			may not be unique			2 01 120 01119
			AA	X509 Issuer Distinguished Name		
			AB	X509 Subject Distinguished Name		
				71507 Budjeet Bistinguished I taine		
			AC	X509 Certificate Serial Number		
	C05010	1570	AC Filter ID Code		X	ID 3/3
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code			
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC	X509 Certificate Serial Number		
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64		
	C05010	1570	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined		
			Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64	value	s
	C05010 C05011	1570 799	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.	value	AN 1/30
	C05011	799	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a position of the code of the	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined	X algor	AN 1/30 rithm
			Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a p Look-up Value	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.  particular format, program, technique or	value	AN 1/30
	C05011 C05012	799 1565	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a p Look-up Value Value used to identifier	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.  particular format, program, technique or ify a certificate containing a public key	X algor	AN 1/30 rithm
	C05011	799	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a p Look-up Value Value used to identifier Assurance Token I	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.  particular format, program, technique or ify a certificate containing a public key Parameters	X algor	AN 1/30 rithm
	C05011 C05012 S4A11	799 1565 C028	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a p Look-up Value Value used to identifier Assurance Token I Parameters needed	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.  particular format, program, technique or ify a certificate containing a public key Parameters to calculate the Assurance Token	X algorization X O	AN 1/30 cithm AN 1/4096
Must Use	C05011 C05012	799 1565	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a p Look-up Value Value used to identifier Assurance Token I Parameters needed to	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.  particular format, program, technique or ify a certificate containing a public key Parameters to calculate the Assurance Token Parameter Code	X algor	AN 1/30 rithm
Must Use	C05011 C05012 S4A11	799 1565 C028	Filter ID Code Code specifying the HDC R64 ZZZ  Version Identifier Revision level of a p Look-up Value Value used to identifier Assurance Token I Parameters needed to	X509 Certificate Serial Number  e type of filter used to convert data code Hexadecimal Filter Radix 64 Mutually Defined Used to specify no filtering.  particular format, program, technique or ify a certificate containing a public key Parameters to calculate the Assurance Token	X algorization X O	AN 1/30 cithm AN 1/4096

			EK	Key Value - One-Time Key		
			KN	Key Name		
			NT	Notarization		
			OD	Key-Encrypting-Key for One-Time Ke	ey	
			UI	User ID		
Must Use	C02802	1442	<b>Assurance Token</b>		M	AN 1/64
N. A. T.	C02002	1420	proper operation of Token; depending of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti f the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute s may	the Assurance be required
Not Used	C02803	1439	Assurance Token A code specifying	the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02804	1442	<b>Assurance Token</b>		O	AN 1/64
			proper operation of Token; depending of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti f the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute s may	the Assurance be required
Not Used	C02805	1439	Assurance Token A code specifying	Parameter Code the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02806	1442	<b>Assurance Token</b>	Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
			proper operation of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti f the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance
Not Used	C02807	1439	Assurance Token A code specifying	Parameter Code the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02808	1442	Assurance Token		O	AN 1/64
Not Used	C02809	1439	proper operation of Token; depending of Assurance Token		npute	the Assurance
				the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02810	1442	proper operation of	Parameter Value teter, usually specifying one or more opti f the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance
Not Used	C02811	1439	Assurance Token A code specifying	Parameter Code the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02812 C02813	1442 1439	Assurance Token A value of a param proper operation of Token; depending of Assurance Token	Parameter Value teter, usually specifying one or more opti the cryptographic algorithm used to com on the algorithm used, one or more value	ons, r	the Assurance
Not Used	C02814	1442	Assurance Token		0	AN 1/64
			A value of a param proper operation of Token; depending of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti f the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	ons, r npute s may	equired for the the Assurance be required
Not Used	C02815	1439	Assurance Token A code specifying	Parameter Code the type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02816 C02817	1442 1439	proper operation of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti f the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance

			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02818	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to cor	npute	the Assurance
			Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value	s may	y be required
Not Used	C02819	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code	$\mathbf{X}$	ID 2/2
			A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter		
Not Used	C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more opti	ons, r	required for the
			proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to con	npute	the Assurance
			Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more value	es may	y be required

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To provide the encoded output of a cryptographic algorithm

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes: 1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S2A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S2A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the SE segment of the transaction set for which assurance is being provided.

See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines.

2. The SVA segment represented here is only valid for versions 003060 and 003070.

	Ref.	Data				
	Des.	<b>Element</b>	<u>Name</u>		Att	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	SVA01	1570	Filter ID Code		M	ID 3/3
			Code specifying the	type of filter used to convert data code	value	es
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
			ASC	ASCII Filter		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
			UUE	Uuencoding		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Use to indicate Base 64.		
Must Use	SVA02	<b>799</b>	Version Identifier		M	AN 1/30
			Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algor	rithm
Must Use	SVA03	C033	Security Value		M	
			Value of the Securit	ty Token		
Must Use	C03301	1572	Security Value Qu Type of Security Va		M	ID 3/3
			ASV	Assurance Token		
			CRT	Certificate		
			PUB	Public Key		
Must Use	C03302	1573	Encoded Security Encoded representa Qualifier	Value tion of the Security Value specified by t	M he Se	AN 1/1E+16 curity Value

**Position:** 080

Loop:

Level: Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To provide the encoded output of a cryptographic algorithm

**Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:** 

**Must Use** 

**Comments:** 

SVA02

**799** 

Notes: The SVA segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

**Data Element Summary** 

Ref. Data **Element Attributes** Des. **Name Must Use** SVA01 1570 Filter ID Code ID 3/3 Code specifying the type of filter used to convert data code values **ASB ASCII-Baudot Filter ASC ASCII** Filter **HDC** Hexadecimal Filter **UUE** UUencoding ZZZ Mutually Defined Use to indicate Base 64.

Version Identifier M AN 1/30

Revision level of a particular format, program, technique or algorithm

Must Use SVA03 C033 Security Value M

Value of the Security Token

Must Use C03301 1572 Security Value Qualifier M ID 3/3

Type of Security Value

ASV Assurance Token
CRT Certificate
PUB Public Key

Must Use C03302 1573 Encoded Security Value M AN 1/1E+16

Encoded representation of the Security Value specified by the Security Value

Qualifier

Segment: S2E Security Trailer Level 2

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To end a secured area and to provide the value of cryptographically computed

authentication codes

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes: The S2E segment represented here is valid for versions 003040, 003050, 003060 and

003070.

### **Data Element Summary**

Ref. Data

Des. Element Name

Must Use S2E01 997 Hash or Authentication Code

M AN 1/64

The message authentication code or hash/digest generated by the authentication process; when the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used, the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded characters (i.e., characters from the set 0..9, A..F), a separator character (space, "-", or other), and 4 hexadecimally coded characters; when non-DES hashes are used, the result of the hash is expressed as hexadecimally coded characters without spaces; when authentication or hash is not used, this field should be filled with a non-blank character other than the set (0..9, A..F) for the minimum length

Segment: S4E Security Trailer Level 2

**Position:** 090

Loop:

Level:

Usage: Optional

**Purpose:** 

Max Use: 1

authentication codes

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

Comments: Notes:

The S4E segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

To end a secured area and to provide the value of cryptographically computed

### **Data Element Summary**

Ref. Data

Des. Element Name

Must Use S4E01 997 Hash or Authentication Code

M AN 1/64

The message authentication code or hash/digest generated by the authentication process; when the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used, the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded characters (i.e., characters from the set 0..9, A..F), a separator character (space, "-", or other), and 4 hexadecimally coded characters; when non-DES hashes are used, the result of the hash is expressed as hexadecimally coded characters without spaces; when authentication or hash is not used, this field should be filled with a non-blank character other than the set (0..9, A..F) for the minimum length

S1A Assurance Level 1 **Segment:** Optional Usage: Max Use: 1 **Purpose:** To allow for multiple assurances at the GS/GE level **Syntax Notes:** If C02804 is present, then C02803 is required. 2 If C02806 is present, then C02805 is required. 3 If C02808 is present, then C02807 is required. 4 If C02810 is present, then C02809 is required. 5 If C02812 is present, then C02811 is required. 6 If C02814 is present, then C02813 is required. 7 If C02816 is present, then C02815 is required. 8 If C02818 is present, then C02817 is required. If C02820 is present, then C02819 is required. **Semantic Notes: Comments:** X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1A04 (security originator). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. 2 X9 has a required minimum length of four characters for S1A05 (security recipient). No mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier. The date/time stamp may determine which of several key values apply, depending on start and expiration dates of different key values that may share the same keyname. Key distribution is performed by other means and thus only onetime keys are allowed in S1A09. The use of particular codes and corresponding values in S1A09 is dependent on the exigencies of the various cryptographic algorithms. **Notes:** 1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S1A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S1A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the GE segment of the group for which assurance is being provided. See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines. 2. The S1A segment represented here is only valid for versions 003060 and 003070. **Data Element Summary** Ref. Data Des. **Element Name Attributes** Must Use S1A01 1432 **Business Purpose of Assurance** ID 3/3 The stated business purpose for appending the assurance to an existing securedentity (whether functional group or transaction set); the codes represent the intention of the business or application that has control over the assurance originator **ASG** Authorization Signature Appropriate to this Document **CSG** Authorization Co-signature Appropriate to this Document Must Use S1A02 C034 **Computation Methods**  $\mathbf{M}$ Algorithms used to calculate an assurance Must Use C03401 1574 **Assurance Algorithm** M ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance token DSS Digital Signature Standard As specified in FIPS 186. **RSA RSA** Must Use C03402 1575 **Hashing Algorithm** M ID 3/3 Code specifying the algorithm used to compute the assurance digest MD5 MD5

AN 1/64

SHA Secure hash algorithm

#### As specified in FIPS 180-1.

# Must Use S1A03 1434 Domain of Computation of Assurance Digest M ID 1/2

The bounds of the text, whether contiguous or not, over which the computation of the Assurance Token is computed using the defined methodology of computation and any relevant Assurance Token parameters; the "body" is either a transaction set (beginning with the ST and including all segments up to the first S2A segment, but excluding any S2S segment) or functional group (beginning with the GS and including all transaction sets up to the first S1A segment, but excluding any S1S segment

"This Assurance" is defined as from the "S" in S1A or S2A up to and including the data element separator preceding the assurance digest

"Previous Assurance(s)" is defined as including the entire S1A or S2A segment and the entire SVA that follows the included S1A or S2A

A Body Only

B Body plus This Assurance Only

# S1A04 1435 Assurance Originator O

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs the stated assurance on data to be interchanged

Note: X9 has a required minimum length of 4 characters for a security originator; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

# S1A05 1436 Assurance Recipient O AN 1/64

Unique designation (identity) of the cryptographic process that performs validation of the stated assurance on received data. In the absence of an Assurance Recipient all potential receivers will often be able to validate the assurance because the cryptographic technique is based on a "public" (as opposed to "secret") technology

Note: X9 has required minimum length of 4 characters for a security recipient; no mechanism, or registration method, is provided by X9 or X12 to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier

#### S1A06 1443 Assurance Reference Number O AN 1/35

Alphanumeric reference number issued by security assurance originator for the particular assurance in which it occurs; unique when used in combination with security originator data element

# S1A07 1437 Date/Time Reference O AN 17/25

Date/time stamp in format as follows:

YYYYMMDDHHNNSSTTTZZZ+XXXX, where YYYY = 4 digit year (with leading century), MM = month of year (01..12), DD = day of month (01..31), HH = hour of day in 24-hour format (00..23), NN = minutes of the hour (00-59), SS = second of hour (00..59), TTT = [optional] milli-seconds (000..999), ZZZ = [optional] three character, nominal time zone indicator (including daylight savings time indicator) and XXXXX = 3-5 digit (including leading + or - sign) offset of time to universal time, with three position format indicating hours-offset for whole hours, and five position format indicating hours and minutes offset where this is necessary. For example:

			199306152213300CDT+0930 which represents 15 June 1993, 22:13 (10:13pm), Central Daylight Time (Nominal Value "CDT"), in a timezone the is offset + 9:30 from Universal Time (Australia)			
	S1A08	1438	Assurance Text	(	O	AN 1/64
			certification number business text related purposes and thus for structure that is defing governmental agency assurance recipient		or mu t defi hough stry g	tually-agreed ned for X12 it may have roup, a
	S1A09	C028	Assurance Token l	Parameters	O	
			Parameters needed	to calculate the Assurance Token		
Must Use	C02801	1439	Assurance Token l		M	ID 2/2
				he type of Assurance Token Parameter		
			CI	Certification Authority ID		
			EK	Key Value - One-Time Key		
			KN	Key Name		
			NT	Notarization		
			OD	Key-Encrypting-Key for One-Time Ke	y	
			UI	User ID		
Must Use Not Used	C02802 C02803	1442 1439	proper operation of Token; depending of <b>Assurance Token l</b>	eter, usually specifying one or more opti the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance
Not Used	C02804	1442	Assurance Token l	Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64
Not Used	C02805	1439	proper operation of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance
not oscu	C02003	1437		he type of Assurance Token Parameter	21	10 2/2
Not Used	C02806	1442	Assurance Token 1	• =	O	AN 1/64
			proper operation of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti the cryptographic algorithm used to con	npute	the Assurance
Not Used	C02807	1439	Token; depending of Assurance Token I	on the algorithm used, one or more value	s may <b>X</b>	be required ID 2/2
Not Oseu	C02007	1437		he type of Assurance Token Parameter	А	11) 2/2
Not Used	C02808	1442	Assurance Token I A value of a parame proper operation of		npute	the Assurance
Not Used	C02809	1439	Assurance Token I A code specifying the	Parameter Code he type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02810	1442	proper operation of Token; depending of	eter, usually specifying one or more opti the cryptographic algorithm used to con on the algorithm used, one or more value	npute	the Assurance be required
Not Used	C02811	1439		he type of Assurance Token Parameter	X	ID 2/2
Not Used	C02812	1442	Assurance Token l	Parameter Value	O	AN 1/64

			A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assur Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required.	rance
Not Used	C02813	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code X ID 2/2 A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	
Not Used	C02814	1442 1439	Assurance Token Parameter Value  A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assur Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required.  Assurance Token Parameter Code  X ID 2/2	or the rance
1101 Oscu	C02013	1437	A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	
Not Used	C02816	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value  A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assur Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required.	or the rance
Not Used	C02817	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code X ID 2/2 A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter	
Not Used	C02818	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value  A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assur Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required.	or the rance
Not Used	C02819	1439	Assurance Token Parameter Code A code specifying the type of Assurance Token Parameter  X ID 2/2	
Not Used	C02820	1442	Assurance Token Parameter Value  A value of a parameter, usually specifying one or more options, required for proper operation of the cryptographic algorithm used to compute the Assur Token; depending on the algorithm used, one or more values may be required.	or the rance red
	S1A10	1440	Assurance Digest O AN 1/5.  The result of the application of the hash defined in the methodology expressin ASCII-hex notation	

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Notes:** 

**Purpose:** To provide the encoded output of a cryptographic algorithm

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

1. Assurance (Digital Signature) segments (S1A/SVA) are not part of the control envelope structure. When used, insert the S1A/SVA segment pair(s) immediately preceding the GE segment of the transaction set for which assurance is being provided.

See Section 10.5.3 of the Federal Implementation Guidelines.

2. The SVA segment represented here is valid for versions 003060 and 003070.

			Data Elem	ent Summary		
	Ref.	Data				
	Des.	<b>Element</b>	<u>Name</u>		Att	<u>ributes</u>
<b>Must Use</b>	SVA01	1570	Filter ID Code		$\overline{\mathbf{M}}$	ID 3/3
			Code specifying the	e type of filter used to convert data code	value	es
			ASB	ASCII-Baudot Filter		
			ASC	ASCII Filter		
			HDC	Hexadecimal Filter		
			UUE	Uuencoding		
			ZZZ	Mutually Defined		
				Use to indicate Base 64.		
Must Use	SVA02	<b>799</b>	Version Identifier		M	AN 1/30
			Revision level of a	particular format, program, technique or	algor	rithm
Must Use	SVA03	C033	Security Value		M	
			Value of the Securi	ty Token		
Must Use	C03301	1572	Security Value Qu Type of Security Va		M	ID 3/3
			ASV	Assurance Token		
			CRT	Certificate		
				Only for use in the 003070 version of	this :	segment.
			PUB	Public Key		
				Only for use in the 003070 version of	this :	segment.
Must Use	C03302	1573	<b>Encoded Security</b>	Value	M	AN 1/1E+16
			Encoded representa Qualifier	tion of the Security Value specified by t	he Se	curity Value

**Position:** 080

Loop:

Level:

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To provide the encoded output of a cryptographic algorithm

**Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:** 

**Comments:** 

Notes: The SVA segment represented here is valid for version 004010.

**Data Element Summary** 

Ref. Data **Element Attributes** Des. **Name Must Use** SVA01 1570 Filter ID Code ID 3/3 Code specifying the type of filter used to convert data code values **ASCII-Baudot Filter ASB ASC ASCII** Filter **HDC** Hexadecimal Filter

UUE UUencoding
ZZZ Mutually Defined

Use to indicate Base 64.

Must Use SVA02 799 Version Identifier M AN 1/30

Revision level of a particular format, program, technique or algorithm

Must Use SVA03 C033 Security Value M

Value of the Security Token

Must Use C03301 1572 Security Value Qualifier M ID 3/3

Type of Security Value

ASV Assurance Token
CRT Certificate
PUB Public Key

Must Use C03302 1573 Encoded Security Value M AN 1/1E+16

Encoded representation of the Security Value specified by the Security Value

Qualifier

Segment: S1E Security Trailer Level 1

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To end a secured area and to provide the value of cryptographically computed

authentication codes

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes: The S1E segment represented here is valid for versions 003060 and 003070.

# **Data Element Summary**

Ref. Data

Des. Element Name

Must Use S1E01 997 Hash or Authentication Code

M AN 1/64

The message authentication code or hash/digest generated by the authentication process; when the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used, the field consists of 4 hexadecimal coded characters (i.e., characters from the set 0..9, A..F), a separator character (space, "-", or other), and 4 hexadecimally coded characters; when non-DES hashes are used, the result of the hash is expressed as hexadecimally coded characters without spaces; when authentication or hash is not used, this field should be filled with a non-blank character other than the set (0..9, A..F) for the minimum length

Segment: S3E Security Trailer Level 1

**Position:** 120

Loop:

Level:

Usage: Optional

Max Use: 1

**Purpose:** To end a secured area and to provide the value of cryptographically computed

authentication codes

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

**Notes:** 

The S3E segment represented here is only valid for version 004010.

### **Data Element Summary**

Ref. Data

Des. Element Name

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Segment:  $\mathbf{GE}$  Functional Group Trailer

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use:

**Purpose:** To indicate the end of a functional group and to provide control information

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes:

1 The data interchange control number GE02 in this trailer must be identical to the same data element in the associated functional group header, GS06.

Comments: 1 Th

1 The use of identical data interchange control numbers in the associated functional group header and trailer is designed to maximize functional group integrity. The control number is the same as that used in the corresponding header.

Notes: The GE segment represented here is valid for version 002003 through 004010.

	Ref.	Data		
	Des.	<b>Element</b>	Name	<u>Attributes</u>
Must Use	GE01	97	Number of Transaction Sets Included	M N0 1/6
			Total number of transaction sets included in the functional g	group or interchange
			(transmission) group terminated by the trailer containing thi	s data element
			1. Use to identify the number of ST segments (transactions	s) within a
			functional group.	
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without leablanks.	ding or trailing
Must Use	GE02	28	Group Control Number	M N0 1/9
			Assigned number originated and maintained by the sender	
			Cite the same group control number as was assigned by the GS06.	e originator in

Segment: IEA Interchange Control Trailer

Usage: Mandatory

Max Use: 1

Purpose: To define the end of an interchange of zero or more functional groups and interchange-

related control segments

Syntax Notes: Semantic Notes: Comments:

Notes: The IEA segment represented here is valid for version 002003 through 004010.

# **Data Element Summary**

	Ref.	Data			
	Des.	<b>Element</b>	<u>Name</u>	Att	<u>ributes</u>
Must Use	IEA01	<b>I16</b>	Number of Included Functional Groups M No 1/5 A count of the number of functional groups included in an interchange		
			1. Use to identify the number of GS segments (functional interchange.	group	os) within an
			2. Transmit the required number of characters without leading or trailing blanks.		
Must Use	IEA02	I12	Interchange Control Number A control number assigned by the interchange sender	M	N0 9/9
					. 11 /1

Cite the same nine-digit interchange control number as was assigned by the originator in ISA13.